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THE WASHINGTON ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT
William H. Rodgers, Jr.*
As the Washington State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA)'
approaches its fourteenth birthday, the time is ripe for an assessment of its
recent history and foreseeable future. Several SEPA milestones have
come and gone in the last several months, and a period of stability is in
order. Reported Washington decisions citing SEPA now number close to
one hundred; more than fifty of these are decisions of the Washington
Supreme Court.2 The books are closed on the two-year efforts of the
Washington Commission on Environmental Policy (the SEPA Commis-
sion), whose work culminated in a report to the 1983 Legislature. 3 There
was a legislative response, albeit one more noteworthy for what it did not
do than for what it did;4 the 1983 Amendments to SEPA are decidedly a
job of fine tuning rather than crude wrecking. As directed by the 1983
Amendments, the Department of Ecology has finished work on the SEPA
Rules. 5 Known popularly as the Green Book,6 these rules will serve as
the principal reference on SEPA for thousands of public officials across
the state in the decade ahead.
* W.H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.A. 196 1, Harvard Univer-
sity; LL.B. 1965, Columbia University.
I. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 43.21C.010-914 (1983). For an authoritative discussion of the Wash-
ington SEPA, see R.L. SETTLE, WASHINGTON LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE,
ch. 5 (1983). A leading early article is Roe & Lean, The State Environmental PolicyAct of1971 and
Its 1973 Amendments, 49 WASH. L. REv. 509 (1974).
2. A computer search in October of 1984 yields 98 citations, 51 of which are Supreme Court
decisions.
3. INITIAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, Washington State Legisla-
ture, Jan. 1983 [hereinafter cited as SEPA COMMISSION REPORT].
4. 1983 Wash. Laws, ch. 117. Among the provisions not adopted in the 1983 Amendments,
despite being urged in various forms, was a repudiation of the "fundamental and inalienable" rights
language creating private causes of action, see infra note 13, the vesting in the Department of Ecol-
ogy of an authority to create legally binding categorical exemptions, the elimination of an obligation
to consider socioeconomic effects, and the imposition of substantial bond requirements as a prerequi-
site to suit, among others. The basic purposes of the 1983 Amendments were to simplify the rules,
reduce paperwork, and improve predictability. See SEcTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY OF S.S.B. 3006,
AS REPORTED OUT OF THE SENATE PARKS AND ECOLOGY COMMITTEE (undated). Useful discussions of
the recent changes can be found in the papers by Snell, Major Changes Under the New SEPA Rules-
1984, and Lean, Major Issues Under SEPA-How They Were Treated in Amendments to the Act and
Rules, in Washington State B.A., THE SECOND ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND USE LAW SECTION MID
YEAR MEETINGS & SEMINARS 3-3, 3-29 (1984).
5. SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH. ADMIN.
CODE ch. 197-11, effective April 4, 1984).
6. Designed to replace, suitably, the Red Book.
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The best starting point for a short sketch of the reach of SEPA is to
acknowledge its kinship with the National Environmental Policy Act of
1970 (NEPA). 7 To this day, the SEPA language repeats verbatim major
parts of NEPA, with obvious consequences for cross-jurisdictional inter-
pretation and the use of precedents. 8 NEPA, and the SEPA's following.
are designed to improve agency decisionmaking and to protect the envi-
ronment. 9 NEPA,10 and the SEPA's following." contain a variety of re-
search, disclosure, and study obligations that are not well-publicized and
that function independently of the much-touted duty to prepare impact
statements. NEPA, and the SEPA's following, feature an impact state-
ment requirement that "combines the legislative objectives of full disclo-
sure, consultation, and reasoned decisionmaking prescribed as the cutting
edge of administrative reform." 12
Among close relatives, differences are more pronounced. The most
striking departure from NEPA in the Washington SEPA is. without a
doubt, the legislative insistence "that each person has a fundamental and
inalienable right to a healthful environment and that each person has a
responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the
environment. '- 13 While this provision to date has been more symbolic
than substantive, the situation may change as the courts extend a new
respect to a policy expression that has demonstrated its staying power and
cast off its reputation as a passing fancy. Other differences between
NEPA and SEPA are clearly discernible, and will be presented in the
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-70 (1982): see W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAl LAW
697-809 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL LAW].
8. Washington courts often cite federal cases and otherwise acknowledge the pertinence of the
federal case law. See, e.g.. Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. City of Tacoma. 84 Wn. 2d 416.
423, 526 P.2d 897. 902 (1974)(en banc).followed in ASARCO. Inc. v. Air Quality Coalition. 92
Wn. 2d 685, 705-06, 601 P.2d 501. 514-15 (1979) (en banc). For a discussion of the NEPA regula-
tions, see Comment, The CEQ Regulations: New Stage in the Evolution of NEPA. 3 HARV. ENVTL L.
REV. 347 (1979). The Green Book rules show strongly the influence of the regulations of the federal
Council on Environmental Quality [hereinafter CEQ]. Kenneth S. Weiner. Seattle attorney who
served as Special Counsel to the Washington SEPA Commission. had a hand in developing the
NEPA rules when he served as Deputy Executive Director of the Council on Environmental Quality.
He is an acknowledged authority on the CEQ regulations.
9. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 7. § 7.10. at 801. See id. § 7.1 I for a general discus-
sion of the thirty or so SEPA's.
10. Seeid. §7.3.at719-25.
11. See, e.g. 42 U.S.C, §§ 4321-35 (1982): WASH. REV. CODE §§43.21C.010-.914 (1983).
12. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW. supra note 7, at 725, quoted with approval in Sierra Club v. Adams.
578 F.2d 389, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
13. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(3) (1983): see Leschi Improvement Council v. Washington
State Highway Comm'n. 84 Wn. 2d 271. 279-80. 525 P.2d 774, 781 11974) ("'The choice of this
language in SEPA indicates in the strongest possible terms the basic importance of environmental
concerns to the people of this state. It is a far stronger policy statement than that found in the National
Environmental Policy Act ...."); ASARCO. Inc. v. Air Quality Coalition. 92 Wn. 2d 685. 700.
601 P.2d 501,512 (1979) (en banc).
Washington SEPA
course of a discussion organized around the issues of: (1) threshold appli-
cability of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) requirements; (2)
statement adequacy or content; (3) SEPA substance; and (4) responsibil-
ity for statement preparation.
I. WHETHER AN EIS IS REQUIRED
A. Major Actions With Significant Environmental Effects
Not surprisingly, the threshold question of applicability is the most
thoroughly litigated single issue under the Washington Environmental
Policy Act. In pertinent terms, the Act links preparation of an EIS to leg-
islation or other "major actions significantly affecting the quality of the
environment." 14 The threshold is set low by the Supreme Court's generic
instructions that an action "significantly" affects the environment
'whenever more than a moderate effect on the quality of the environment
is a reasonable probability."' 15 Other criteria emerging in the case law
include whether the proposal would work substantial changes to the exist-
ing background of land uses, or whether it would produce cumulative
harm or other indicia of significant quantitative effects. 16 The point, of
course, is to cull out the actions that would benefit from the additional
study and deliberation associated with preparation of the EIS.
Courts have found a "major" action with "significant" effects where
the proposal would transform radically a fifty-two-acre wooded glen into
a residential suburban neighborhood,17 authorize the destruction of a sig-
nificant stand of first-growth timber, '8 encroach upon fourteen acres of
land on a small lake encompassing a bald eagle habitat, 19 endorse a thir-
teen story condominium on the stately residential slopes of Queen Anne
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(c) (1983); id. § 43.21C.031 (an EIS "shall be prepared on
proposals for legislation and other major actions having a probable, significant adverse environmental
impact"); SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 197-11-330) (effective April 4, 1984).
15. Norway Hill Preservation and Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wn. 2d 267,
278, 552 P.2d 674, 680 (1976) (en banc).
16. Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. City of Tacoma, 84 Wn. 2d 416,423, 526 P.2d 897, 902
(1974) (en banc) (citing Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 908 (1973),followed in ASARCO, Inc. v. Air Quality Coalition, 92 Wn. 2d 685, 705-06, 601
P.2d 501, 514-15 (1979) (en banc)); see also Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wn. 2d 754, 764, 513 P.2d
1023, 1029 (1973) (en banc) ("Not only must the action significantly affect the environment, but it
must be nonduplicative.").
17. Norway Hill Preservation and Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wn. 2d 267, 552
P.2d 674 (1976) (en banc).
18. Noel v. Cole, 98 Wn. 2d 375, 655 P.2d 245 (1982) (en banc).
19. Department of Natural Resources v. Thurston County, 92 Wn. 2d 656, 659-60, 601 P.2d
494, 495-96 (1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980).
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Hill,20 clear the way for a private commercial overnight campground on
252 acres abutting the pristine waters of Hood Canal, 21 approve the dis-
charge of thousands of tons of pollutants onto the community even in face
of the claims that this was the way it has always been, 22 rezone a 141-acre
lot in the North Creek Valley of Bothell to make way for a regional shop-
ping center, 23 approve the location of a major marina in a biologically
sensitive area of the San Juan Islands, 24 or endorse a housing develop-
ment that would hit hard on rare bird life as well as an area listed in the
National Register of Historic Sites on Whidbey Island. 25 Often in these
cases it is possible to detect significant opposition, unique and irreplace-
able cultural or biological resources, or prospects for cumulative effects
or snowballing development. In different ways, these considerations offer
a rough cultural or community vote (as distinguished from a political
vote) underscoring the significance attending reallocation of these natural
resources.
By contrast, proposals or actions not needing EIS's take on the hue of
the routine and unexceptional. An affirmance of a negative declaration is
the likely outcome in cases of typical construction projects in urban
areas. 26 The same is true of a rezoning (from single-family dwelling to
planned residential development) of an eighty-nine acre tract in Tacoma
overlooking the Tacoma Narrows 27 that amounts to a paper shuffle work-
ing no practical change in usage. A similar example of this paper-shuffle
principle is Marino Properties v. Port of Seattle,28 which holds that a
mere change in ownership without expected changes in use of the prop-
erty does not trigger the EIS requirements. Another group of cases, better
viewed as timing cases, 29 find no "major action" attending a variety of
20. Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle. 90 Wn. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978) (en banc).
21. Toandos Peninsula Ass'n v. Jefferson County. 32 Wn. App. 473. 648 P.2d 448 (1982).
22. ASARCO, Inc. v. Air Quality Coalition. 92 Wn. 2d 685. 702-05. 601 P.2d 501. 513-14
(1979) (en banc).
23. Leonard v. City of Bothell. 87 Wn. 2d 847, 557 P.2d 1306 (1976) (en banc) (EIS prepared
voluntarily).
24. Sisley v. San Juan County. 89 Wn. 2d 78. 569 P.2d 712 (1977) (en banc.
25. Swift v. Island County, 87 Wn. 2d 348. 552 P.2d 175 (1976) (en banc).
26. Hayden v. City of Port Townsend. 93 Wn. 2d 870. 879-81. 613 P.2d 1164. 1169-70 (1980)
(en bane) (the building of a supermarket in an industrial and commercial area of the City of Port
Townsend); Lassila v. City of Wenatchee. 89 Wn. 2d 804. 817-18. 576 P.2d 54, 61-62 (1978) (en
banc) (rezoning of 6.3 acres in the course of redevelopment of the Wenatchee central business dis-
trict); Brown v. City of Tacoma, 30 Wn. App. 762. 637 P.2d 1005 (1981) (34 unit condominium
within City of Tacoma): Richland Homeowner's Preservation Ass'n v. Young. 18 Wn. App. 405.
568 P.2d 818 (1977) (83 unit apartment complex within the City of Richland).
27. Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. City of Tacoma. 84 Wn. 2d 416. 526 P.2d 897 (1974)
(en banc).
28. Marino Property Co. v. Port of Seattle. 88 Wn. 2d 822. 831.567 P.2d 1125. 1130 (1977) len
bane).
29. ENVIRONNMENTAL. LAW. supra note 7 § 7.7 (discussing when an EIS must be prepared).
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preliminary planning moves that cannot produce observable impact with-
out later decisions that can be attended by full EIS compliance.30
Other variables are at work in these threshold judgments of whether
there is "major" action afoot with "significant" environmental effects.
The Washington courts acknowledge the possibility that nondiscretionary
or ministerial decisions need not pause for the assembly of environmental
data that cannot be heeded3' but they are routinely skeptical of arguments
that the agency is afforded no room for choice by its statutory mandate.32
So, too, it is said that an action is not "major" unless it is "nonduplica-
tive, "33 by which is meant that it has not been addressed by the functional
equivalent of an EIS earlier within the regulatory regime. But NEPA's
functional equivalency exception, most closely associated with the work
of the federal Environmental Protection Agency, 34 is virtually without
representation in Washington law.
To be sure also, officials with different geographical and jurisdictional
domains may have different opinions on the features of "major" action
with "significant" effects. These invisible criteria no doubt may explain
some of the choices. With this much said, a simple recitation may have
explanatory value. In addition to those cases mentioned above, an EIS
has been required for:
* construction of a permanent breakwater, piers, and floats to de-
velop a boat marina on 12.5 acres of Burke Bay and 10 acres of
heavily wooded uplands;35
* construction of 0.625 miles of highway in the City of Mountlake
Terrace; 36
* issuance of a grading permit authorizing excavation of up to
100,000 cubic yards of material; 37
30. Harris v. Hornbaker, 98 Wn. 2d 650, 663-64, 658 P.2d 1219, 1225 (1983) (en banc) (no EIS
required for county approval of a six-year road plan that is advisory not regulatory); Carpenter v.
Island County, 89 Wn. 2d 881, 884, 577 P.2d 575, 577 (1978) (en banc) (annexation of territory to a
sewer district). Contrast Byers v. Board of Clallum County Comm'rs, 84 Wn. 2d 796, 800, 529 P.2d
823,827 (1974) (en banc) (adoption of an interim zoning ordinance requires preparation of an EIS).
31. This is the implication of Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc., 82 Wn. 2d
475, 488, 513 P.2d 36, 45 (1973) (en banc), discussed in Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wn. 2d 754, 764,
513 P.2d 1023, 1029 (1973) (en banc), and ASARCO, Inc. v. Air Quality Coalition, 92 Wn. 2d 685,
601 P.2d 501, 512 (1979) (en banc).
32, See infra note 169 (on SEPA's role in expanding statutory mandates).
33. Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wn. 2d 754, 764-65,513 P.2d 1023, 1029 (1973) (en banc).
34. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 7 § 7.6, at 765-66.
35. Merkel v. Port of Brownsville, 8 Wn. App. 844, 846-48, 509 P.2d 390, 392-93 (1973)
(SEPA conceded to be applicable).
36. Cheney v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 87 Wn. 2d 338, 552 P.2d 184 (1976) (en banc).
37. See Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 72-73, 510
P.2d 1140, 1149 (1973) (remanding, however, for another look at whether an EIS is required).
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* approval of the conversion of 40 acres of agricultural land into
lots for mobile homes on soils unsuited to septic tanks 3 8
* adoption of an interim zoning ordinance; 39
* authorization of the construction of a 128-unit. 5-story condo-
minium apartment building (the Roanoke Reef Project) on Lake
Union in Seattle; 40
* issuance of a water appropriation permit authorizing the with-
drawal of .7 cubic feet per second of water from Loon Lake to serve
the domestic needs of 123 lots;4 1
* issuance of a substantial development permit under the Shore-
line Management Act allowing harvest of subtidal clams by a mech-
nical harvester; 42
* establishment of a business park zone to enable construction of
an electronics manufacturing facility; 43
* issuance of a permit to build a pier;44
* approval of a proposal to develop 26 acres of agricultural and
forest land near the Town of Poulsbo;45
* stripmining of sand and gravel on a tract in South King County;46
* county and city zoning action allowing construction of a shopping
center;4
7
* an annexation clearing the way for construction of a shopping
mall and office complex; 48
38. See Newaukum Hill Protective Ass'n v. Lewis County. 19 Wn. App. 162. 168. 574 P.2d
1195.1199(1978):
We have the definite and firm conviction that it was a mistake to excuse an EIS ... [lhtch
should] give detailed consideration to the alternative possibilities of a community sewer system.
larger lots. or indeed delaying development of this heavy concentration of population until the
entire area can be embraced in a municipal sewer system.
39. Byers v. Board of Clallam County Comm'rs. 84 Wn. 2d 796. 801-02. 529 P.2d 823. 828
(1974) (en bane) (emphasizing that the term "'major action" is not synonomous with the word "prot-
ect': rejecting pleas of difficulty as a reason for noncomphance).
40. Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs.. Inc., 82 Wn. 2d 475.498, 513 P 2d 36. 50
(1973) (en bane).
41. Stempel v. Department of Water Resources. 82Wn. 2d 109. 117.508 P.2d 166. 171 (1973)
42. Kitsap County. v. Department of Natural Resources, 99 Wn. 2d 386 388, 392. 662 P 2d 38 1.
382, 384 (1983) (en bane) (disallowing as untimely a challenge to the adequacy of an EIS not raised in
administrative proceedings).
43. Save Our Rural Environment v. Snohomish County. 99 Wn. 2d 363. 371.662 P.2d 816. 820
(1983)(enbanc).
44. See Clampitt v. Thurston County. 98 Wn. 2d 638. 658 P.2d 641 (1983) (en bane) (a dispute
that mushrooms into a donnybrook over a reporter's privilege not to disclose confidential sources).
45. Briedablik Community Ass'n v. Kitsap County. 33 Wn. App. 108.652 P.2d 383 (1982).
46. Weyerhaeuser Real Estate Co. v. Stoneway Concrete. Inc.. 96 Wn. 2d 558. 561-62. 637 P 2d
647, 649-50 (1981) (en bane) (minimum cost of SEPA statement of $35.000 one of the reasons for
abandoning the project: court applies doctrine of commercial frustration because parties did not antici-
pate the vigorous environmental opposition that would follow in the wake of SEPA).
47. Barrie v. Kitsap County, 93 Wn. 2d 843,843-57. 613 P.2d 1148. 1148-57 (1980) (en bane).
48. Cf. City of Bellevue v. King County Boundary Review Bd., 90 Wn. 2d 856. 868. 586 P,2d
470, 477 (1978) (en bane) (environmental assessment inadequate: reserves decision on whether the
annexation decision required a full EIS).
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* incorporation of a Riverfront Development Plan into a city's
comprehensive plan for developing the downtown area;49
* approval of a housing project creating a threat to groundwater in
apparent violation of Washington Administration Code (WAC) re-
quirements addressing minimum lot sizes on certain types of soils;50
* a project approval contemplating placement of a commercial fa-
cility (a miniwarehouse and U-Haul dealership) in an essentially ru-
ral residential area;51
* an initiative amending a city zoning ordinance to prevent the
construction of multiple family dwellings in over half the City of
Bremerton; 52
* approval of a preliminary plat for a new subdivision opposed by
some of the neighbors;53
* issuance of a substantial development permit authorizing a land-
fill affecting ninety-three acres in the Snohomish River estuary, and
including construction of docks, a railroad spur, and a steel fabrica-
tion facility. 54
By contrast, no EIS is required for:
* issuance of a conditional use permit by the Grays Harbor County
Board of Adjustment to the prospective builder of a mobile home
park;55
* approval of a boating destination site consisting of two mooring
buoys, five campsites, a group of fire rings, four picnic sites, two
vault toilets, a well, signs, fencing, screening and improvement of
an existing access road;56
* changing of location of a highway interchange and approval of a
six-year road plan;57
* a thirty-four unit condominium located within the City of Ta-
coma;58
49. See Lassila v. City of Wenatchee, 89 Wn. 2d 804, 816-17, 576 P.2d 54, 60-61 (1978) (en
banc) (this was a "recommendation or report on proposals for legislation" and probably also "major
action").
50. See Gardner v. Pierce County Bd. of Comm'rs, 27 Wn. App. 241,245-46, 617 P.2d 743,746
(1980).
51. See Cook v. Clallum County, 27 Wn. App. 410,414-15,618 P.2d 1030, 1033-34 (1980).
52. See Lince v. City of Bremerton, 25 Wn. App. 309, 607 P.2d 329 (1980) (affirming the trial
court on the ground that the zoning ordinance could not be amended by initiative).
53. D.E.B.T., Ltd. v. Board of Clallum County Comm'rs, 24 Wn. App. 136, 600 P.2d 628
(1979).
54. See Hayes v. Yount, 87 Wn. 2d 280, 283-84, 552 P.2d 1038, 1041 (1976) (en banc) (an
important Shoreline Management Act case).
55. Johnston v. Grays Harbor County Bd. ofAdjustment, 14Wn. App. 378,541 P.2d 1232 (1975)
(upholding the declaration of nonsignificance).
56. San Juan County v. Department of Natural Resources, 28 Wn. App. 796, 801, 626 P.2d 995,
997-98(1981).
57. See Harris v. Hornbaker, 98 Wn. 2d 650, 662-63, 658 P.2d 1219, 1224-25 (1983) (en banc)
(Department of Transportation, the lead agency, must decide whether a supplemental EIS is required).
58. Brown v. City of Tacoma, 30 Wn. App. 762,637 P.2d 1005 (1981) (although the court affirms
a declaration of nonsignificance the applicant was required to hire an engineering firm to analyze noise,
shadow effect, and view blockage).
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* a city's creation of a separate fund to be used for planning and
construction of riverfront development; 59
* the acquisition of real property with no plan of development; 60
* the execution of design and engineering contracts; 6'
* rezone of 6.3 acres in the course of redevelopment of the Wen-
atchee central business district;62
* the building of a supermarket in an industrial and commercial
area of the City of Port Townsend; 63
* bond issuance by the Seattle Port Authority to reacquire piers
from the Navy without proposing to change intensity of uses chal-
lenged by a commercially interested party. 64
B. Review of Negative and Positive Declarations
A declaration of nonsignifiance [hereinafter DNS] is reviewable judi-
cially under the "clearly erroneous" test, 65 which means that the court
may search the entire record and reverse if convinced that a mistake has
been made. This decidedly nondeferential standard is justified in various
ways: the judgment on applicability is akin to a legal determination where
the court should have the last word, 66 the agency's expertise is nonenvi-
ronmental and therefore not a cause for restraint but a reason for scru-
tiny, 67 or the courts should be reluctant to let go of SEPA's bold policies
59. Lassila v. City of Wenatchee, 89 Wn. 2d 804, 814, 576 P.2d 54.60 (1978) (en bane) (at-
tempted environmental evaluation at funding stage would be purely speculative).
60. Id. at 815.576 P.2d at 60.
61. Id. at 815-16, 576 P.2d at 60 ("While such decisional aids may have some political impact.
they have no impact on the environment.").
62. Id. at 817-18. 576 P.2d at 61-62.
63. Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, 93 Wn. 2d 870, 879-81. 613 P.2d 1164. 1169-70 (1980)
(en bane).
64. Marino Property Co. v. Port of Seattle. 88 Wn. 2d 822.831. 567 P.2d 1125. 1130 (1977) (en
banc).
65. See. e.g., Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, 93 Wn. 2d 870. 880. 613 P.2d 1164. 1170
(1980) (en bane); Sisley v. San Juan County, 89 Wn. 2d 78, 84. 569 P.2d 712. 716 (1977) (en banc):
Norway Hill Preservation and Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wn. 2d 267. 274. 552
P.2d 674, 678 (1976) (en bane); Short v. Clallum County. 22 Wn. App. 825. 830. 593 P.2d 821. 824
(1979); Richland Homeowners Preservation Ass'n v. Young. 18 Wn. App. 405. 408-09. 568 P.2d
818, 820 (1977) (both clearly erroneous and arbitrary and capricious standards are available): John-
ston v. Grays Harbor County Bd. of Adjustment, 14 Wn. App. 378, 541 P.2d 1232 (1975) (closely
examining procedures attending a declaration of nonsignificance [hereinafter DNS]: complaining par-
ties, however, do not have a right to be mailed copies of documents in advance of a hearing and have
no right to cross-examine the author).
66. See Norway Hill Preservation and Protection Ass'n v. King County Council. 87 Wn. 2d 267.
273. 552 P.2d 674, 678 (1976) (en bane) (a DNS is "more than a simple finding of fact because the
correctness of a no significant impact determination is integrally linked to the act's mandated public
policy of environmental consideration").
67. See Short v. Clallam County, 22 Wn. App. 825, 830. 593 P.2d 821, 824 (1979) (reviewing
positive declaration by the Board of County Commissioners) (arbitrary and capricious test).
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that are pulled down by any negative declaration. 68 This close scrutiny is
firmly in the tradition of the federal hard look doctrine that attends a wide
variety of regulatory endeavors with environmental effects.6 9 This skepti-
cal oversight is sustained-no doubt by theoretical and empirical convic-
tions that agencies doing what is best for themselves may not be doing
what is best for the environment and its public constituency..
Losers presented with negative declarations are offered a variety of
process rights, although several of these are ill-defined. It is clear that the
agency is obliged to defend its choice, 70 and that choice must be based on
a review of the environmental checklist, 71 an actual consideration of envi-
ronmental effects, 72 and the searching out of additional information
where it would cast light on the proposal at hand. 73 Hearings, 74 especially
formal ones,75 are not required to substantiate the adequacy of a negative
declaration although the agency that makes provision for public hearings
of some sort has made a good investment in demonstrating both the good
faith and reliability of its judgments. 76 A number of courts have approved
negative declarations that were not reduced to writing, 77 despite the
68. See Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, 93 Wn. 2d 870, 880, 613 P.2d 1164, 1169 (1980) (en
banc) ("to reach a valid negative threshold determination, environmental factors must, have been
evaluated to such an extent as to constitute prima facie compliance with SEPA procedural require-
ments") (dicta) (following Sisley v. San Juan County, 89 Wn. 2d 78, 569 P.2d 712 (1977)); see also
Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 82 Wn. 2d 475, 489-93, 513 P.2d 36, 45-47
(1973) (en banc), supra note 66.
69. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW. supra note 7 §§ 1.5, 3.2A (1984 Supp.).
70. Topping v. Pierce County Bd. of Comm'rs, 29 Wn. App. 781, 630 P.2d 1385 (1981).
71. SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WAsH. ADMIN.
CODE § 197-11-315).
72, Id. § 197-11-330 (1984); City of Bellvue v. King County Boundary Review Bd., 90 Wn. 2d
856, 867, 586 P.2d 470, 477 (1978) (en banc) (threshold determination heed conform to no particular
format so long as environmental assessment was undertaken); Narrowsview.Preservation. Ass'n v..
City of Tacoma, 84 Wn. 2d 416, 423,526 P.2d 897, 902 (1974) (en banc).
73. SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH. ADMIN.,
CODE § 197-11-335).
74. See id. § 197-11-330 (spelling out the threshold determination process). Compare id. § 197-
11-340(b) (specifying the notice that must accompany issuance of a DNS) with § 197-11-535 (speci-
fying circumstances under which a public hearing must be held in connection with preparation of an
EIS).
75. Cf. Johnston v. Grays Harbor County Bd. of Adjustment, 14 Wn. App. 378, 382-83, 541
P.2d 1232, 1235-36 (1975) (author of DNS need not be made available for cross-examination).
76. See Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. City of Tacoma, 84 Wn. 2d 416, 526 P.2d 897
(1974) (en banc).
77. Compare Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, 93 Wn. 2d 870, 881, 613 P.2d 1164, 1170
(1980) (en bane) and San Juan County v. Department of Natural Resources, 28 Wn. App. 796, 801,
626 P.2d 995, 997-98 (1981) (sustaining negative declaration based on environmental checklist pre-
pared by applicant over objections that it was unacceptably conclusory) with In re Petition of Port of
Grays Harbor, 30 Wn. App. 855, 865, 638 P.2d 633, 639 (1982) (dicta) (a mere declaration of
nonsignificance probably will not suffice absent a written record showing that environmental factors
actually were considered). A written record, even a letter, is a helpful aid to the decisionmaker who
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obvious risk that dispensing with this minimum formality encourages su-
perficial review and ex post facto justification.
Ultimately, the courts must be convinced that the judgment of no sig-
nificant environmental effects was genuinely undertaken, fairly ex-
plained, and intuitively correct. The solicitation of information from
other agencies and even a pro forma hearing will not suffice to sustain a
negative declaration if it produces a record "filled with many assertions,
numerous unanswered questions and a paucity of information.' 78 Espe-
cially is this so where the decisionmaker's reasoning is missing so that
neither the public nor the reviewing court can understand the rationale of
the action. 79 Negative declarations are not sustained where the threshold
decision was clearly not made, 80 where there is a plausible showing of
environmental and economic damage, 81 where there is evidence the pro-
gram was artificially contrived to avoid SEPA compliance, 82 where there
are apparent violations of WAC requirements dealing with minimum lot
sizes on certain types of soil,83 and where the planning official's opinion
on nonsignificance is contradicted by a host of expert and agency opin-
ions. 84 By the same token, an affirmance of a DNS will be forthcoming
where there is a convincing showing the environmental factors were con-
sidered and nothing to suggest the judgment was wrong. 85
For a variety of reasons (not excluding the expense and effort involved
in EIS preparation) litigation in Washington tends to focus more on the
threshold decision to forego an EIS than on the adequacy of the document
once prepared. Tactically, this puts challengers in an enviable position
because it requires them to show only that the judgment of nonsignifi-
cance is implausible. The better litigated cases come to the courts of ap-
peals on records containing numerous unanswered questions about
may issue a casual DNS based chiefly on representations of the applicant, only to discover that the
project that unfolds is a remote caricature of the project approved. See SEPA Rules. WASH ADNIIN.
REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-340(3)(a)) (on pro-
cedures for withdrawing a DNS for fraud or the discovery of substantial new information).
78. Sisley v. San Juan County, 89 Wn. 2d 78. 85. 569 P.2d 712. 717 (1977) (en bane).
79. Id.
80. Downtown Traffic Planning Comm. v. Royer, 26 Wn. App. 156. 159-60. 165. 612 P.2d
430,433. 436 (1980) (negative declaration was held on a categorical exemption).
81. See, e.g., Swift v. Island County, 87 Wn. 2d 348. 358-61.552 P.2d 175. 181-83 (1976) (en
bane).
82. See Downtown Traffic Planning Comm. v. Royer, 26 Wn. App. 156. 162. 612 P.2d 430,
434 (1980).
83. Gardner v, Pierce County Bd. of Comm'rs. 27 Wn. App. 241. 245-46. 617 P.2d 743. 746
(1980).
84. Swift v. Island County, 87 Wn. 2d 348. 358-61, 552 P.2d 175. 181-83 (1976) (en bane).
85. Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, 93 Wn. 2d 870, 879-81. 613 P.2d 1164, 1169-70 (1980)
(en bane) (sustaining negative declaration where city engineer reviews the proposal. meets with the
applicant and governmental entitities, and undertakes to mitigate environmental effects).
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possible effects raised by agencies, experts, and the public at large. 86 The
predicted result of a sharp judicial scrutiny is a high casualty rate for
agency DNS's.
Judicial review of positive declarations of environmental significance
(which presage EIS preparation) has been undertaken in a few cases. 87
The standard of review is narrow, in accordance with the arbitrary and
capricious test, 88 as might be expected since the consequence of error fa-
vors the diverse interests protected by SEPA at the expense of the de-
veloper who suffers the added costs and delay. Nonetheless, the neutral
features of hard look process rights, which serve to protect environ-
mentalists and builders alike, 89 have not gone unnoticed in Washington
law. 90 This means that some scrutiny will be given to the decision to
require a statement. The most striking instance, of judicial second-
guessing of a positive declaration occurred in a context where the EIS
obligation looked very much like a tool to punish a trickster who won
approval to build a warehouse by the simple expedient of calling it a
barn.91
C. Mitigated Declaration ofNonsignificance
The Green Book endorses the notion that a developer can get out from
under the EIS obligation by simply mitigating the bad effects that recom-
mended the EIS in the first place. 92 Case law endorses this escape-route 93
86. Sisley v. San Juan County, 89 Wn. 2d 78, 87-89, 569 P.2d 712, 717-18 (1977) (en banc);
Swift v. Island County, 87 Wn. 2d 348, 358-61, 552 P.2d 175, 181-83 (1976) (en banc); Downtown
Traffic Planning Comm. v. Royer, 26 Wn. App. 156, 161-62, 612 P.2d 430, 434 (1980).
87. D.E.B.T., Ltd. v. Board of Clallam County Comm'rs, 24 Wn. App. 136, 600 P.2d 628
(1979) (rejecting equal protection claim and the argument that the board could not contradict the
judgment of the planning commission); Short v. Clallam County, 22 Wn. App. 825, 833-36, 593
P.2d 821, 826-27 (1979); cf. Cook v. Clallam County, 27 Wn. App. 410, 414-15, 618 P.2d 1030,
1033-34 (1980) (sustaining project rejection on basis of disclosures in the EIS). Compare WASH.
REV. CODE § 43.21C.075(3)(a) (1983) (limiting interlocutory appeals; raising doubts about reviewa-
bility of positive declarations).
88. Short v. Clallam County, 22 Wn. App. 825, 829-30,593 P.2d 821, 824 (1979).
89. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 7 §§ 1.5, 3.2A (1984 Supp.).
90. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Air Quality Coalition, 92 Wn. 2d 685, 700, 702, 601 P.2d 501,
512-13 (1979) (en banc); Pentagram Corp. v. City of Seattle, 28 Wn. App. 219, 227-30, 622 P.2d
892, 896-97 (1981) (a project denial by City Council to construct restaurant and meeting facility at
100 foot level of the Space Needle overturned in the absence of written findings and conclusions).
91. Short v. Clallam County, 22 Wn. App. 825,593 P.2d 821 (1979).
92. SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 197-11-350).
93. Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, 93 Wn. 2d 870. 880-81, 613 P.2d 1164, 1169-70 (1980)
(en banc); Brown v. City of Tacoma, 30 Wn. App. 762, 766-68, 637 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1981) (miti-
gating erosion effects and noise); Richland Homeowner's Preservation Ass'n v. Young, 18 Wn. App.
405, 416-18, 568 P.2d 818, 824-25 (1977) (dust control).
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although it has not escaped notice either that last-minute, ad hoc mitiga-
tion is a reliable indicator of major action with significant effects. 94
The issue of a mitigated DNS is hotly debated, 95 and for reasons easy
to intuit. On the one hand, if mitigation can diminish the consequences,
then there is no reason in theory why the anticipated effects cannot be
drawn down below the statutory boiling point at which an EIS is required.
On the other hand, what this process approves is a kind of backroom bar-
gaining outside of the normal glare of EIS procedures. A mitigated DNS
lacks the enforceability, outside scrutiny, and investigation that would
attend the process were the mitigation commitments to flow from EIS
preparation. The mitigated DNS procedure effectively raises the thresh-
old for EIS preparation by allowing pre-project bargaining to avoid the
consequences most feared. One obvious derivative consequence is to in-
tensify the pressures for process fairness by potential losers at the thresh-
old decisionmaking stage. In the early days of NEPA the Second Circuit
approved this process extension by suggesting that a public hearing was
appropriate prior to the decision to write an impact statement.96 As Judge
Friendly put it in dissent, "[Tihe agency would do better to prepare an
impact statement in the first instance." 97 The relationship between
threshold and pre-decision process rights appears to be directly corre-
lated: the higher the threshold, the heavier the process obligation to sus-
tain the choice to forego an EIS. Mitigated DNS's will remain under
sharp scrutiny.
D. Categorical Exemptions
At the federal level, the NEPA exemptions claimed by the federal
agencies are scattered throughout the Code of Federal Regulations in the
implementing regulations of the individual agencies. In Washington, the
categorical exemptions are collected in the Green Book. 98 There is no
comprehensive rationale behind these exemptions. They extend to
94. See Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685 F.2d
678 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
95. Comment, Subdivision Exactions in Washington: The Controversy Over Inposing Fees on
Developers. 59 WASH. L. REv. 289, 301-02 (1984) (on the use of SEPA to require payment of
mitigation costs of development).
96. Hanly v. Kleindienst (Hanly Il), 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972). cert. denied. 416 U.S. 936
(1976). Compare supra note 74 (no hearing now required in connection with preparation of DNS). It
is gospel among attorneys for developers that solicitation of the staff should occur early and often, as
part of a campaign to win support for the project. This phenomenon offers empirical support to the
efforts of opponents to get a procedural foot in the door at the early stages.
97. 471 F.2d at 839.
98. Part Nine, SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH.
ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-11-800 to -890).
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activities with minimal effects (e.g., minor new construction), 99 emer-
gencies where compliance with SEPA would be difficult, 00 nondis-
cretionary activities where evaluation couldn't make a difference,' 0'
regulatory choices prompting analyses functionally approximating the
SEPA review (issuance of waste discharge permits or approval of solid
waste management plans), 102 and surprise interpretations especially an-
noying to an aggrieved constituency (school closures). 103 One is tempted
to invoke sheer interest group politics as the most satisfactory explanation
for the generous and sometimes implausible exemptions extended to a
number of agencies. 104
Without resorting to a discussion of the credibility of exempting, for
example, an approval for in-stream gravel removal by the Department of
Fisheries, it deserves mention that categorical exemptions are categorical
misnomers. While the legislation insists that the SEPA rules are to be
honored, 105 it declares also that the exemptions "shall be limited to those
types [of actions] which are not major actions significantly affecting the
quality of the environment." 106 This means, quite clearly, that the courts
are obliged to assess independently whether a claimed exemption requires
an EIS, and there are good reasons to expect this review to be vigor-
ous. 107 The record, after all, is likely to consist of little more than evi-
dence that the agency has taken refuge behind this or that exemption in
the face of a plausible showing of environmental damage by objecting
99. Id. § 197-11-800(I)(a).
100. Id. § 197-11-880.
101. Id. § 197-11-840(3) (issuance of hunting or fishing licenses). Compare Eastlake Commu-
nity Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc., 82 Wn. 2d 475, 482, 488,513 P.2d 36. 41-42, 44-45 (1973)
(administration of a zoning ordinance).
102. SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 197-11-855(1), (2)).
103. Id. § 197-11-800(7). A school closure exemption is approved by WASH. REV. CODE
§ 43.21C.038 (1983).
104. See, e.g., SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-1 1-800(25)(a)) (all class I, II, and III forest practices) (mandated by
statute in WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.037 (1983)); SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-
020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-800(25)(i)) (periodic use of chemicals to
maintain public park and recreation land); id. § 197-11-830(5) (Department of Natural Resources;
permits for geothermal test drilling); id. § 197-1 1-835(2), (3) (Department of Fisheries; hydraulic
project approvals); id. § 197-11-840 (1), (6) (Department of Game. establishment of hunting, trap-
ping, or fishing seasons; hydraulic project approvals); id. § 197-11-800(9) (approval of variances
under the Clean Air Act); id. § 197-11-800(5) (purchase or acquisition of any right to real property).
105. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.095 (1983) (rules are to be accorded "substantial deference").
106. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C. I 10(l)(a) (1983).
107. See, e.g., Noel v. Cole, 98 Wn. 2d 375, 380 n.2, 655 P.2d 245, 249 n.2 (1982) (en banc);
Barrie v. Kitsap County, 93 Wn. 2d 843, 858-59, 613 P.2d 1148, 1157 (1980) (en banc) (invalidat-
ing certain sections of the WASH. ADMIN. CODE as inconsistent with SEPA): Downtown Traffic Plan-
ning Comm. v. Royer, 26 Wn. App. 156, 164-65, 612 P.2d 430,435-36 (1980).
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parties. 10 8 The categorical exemption procedure protects the agencies
from paperwork they wish to avoid, but also lulls them into a demurrer
strategy vulnerable to judicial second-guessing.
This is not to say that the Green Book categories are disregarded in
SEPA cases. The courts often invoke the exemptions, 109 usually in sup-
port of a conclusion that the action attacked was not a major action requir-
ing EIS preparation. The exemptions nonetheless remain an accurate mir-
ror of agency practice but only a rough outline of what the courts consider
major action.
A close examination of the Green Book confirms a decided reluctance
of the Department of Ecology to conform its categorical exemptions to
judicial holdings on "major" actions. Indeed, the exemptions are so nu-
merous and explicit that they disclose an administrative determination to
"overrule" judicial decisions considered disagreeable. 01 This tendency
is aggravated by an explicit procedure inviting agencies to petition the
Department of Ecology for changes in exemptions to accommodate
agency plans.' Handing out dispensations in the mistaken belief that
DOE has the last word has its dangers. The efficiency benefits and paper-
work avoidance attending the categorical exemption procedure are utterly
108. Id. at 158-59.
109. Marino Property Co. v. Port of Seattle. 88 Wn. 2d 822, 830-31. 567 P.2d 1125. 1129-30
(1977) (en bane) (invoking categorical exemption for the purchase and acquisition of real property
and for the issuance of bonds): Carpenter v. Island County, 89 Wn. 2d 881. 888. 577 P.2d 575. 579
(en bane) (1978) (citing exemption for storm water and sewer hookups to lines of less than eight
inches in diameter): In re Petition of Port of Grays Harbor, 30 Wn. App. 855. 865. 638 P.2d 633.
639 (1982) (invoking exemption for the purchase and acquisition of real property): Jablinske v. Sno-
homish County, 28 Wn. App. 848, 853. 626 P.2d 543. 546 (1981) (invoking exemption for emer-
gency actions): Short v. Clallam County, 22 Wn. App. 825. 835, 593 P.2d 821. 827 (1979) (invok-
ing exemption for small structures). Compare Public Utility Dist. No. I of Snohomish County v.
Kottsick, 86 Wn. 2d 388, 545 P.2d 1 (1976) (en bane) (SEPA applies in condemnation actions) and
State v. Burch, 7 Wn. App. 657, 660-61. 501 P.2d 1239, 1241-42 (1972) (suggesting that SEPA
applies in eminent domain proceedings) with State v. Hutch. 30 Wn. App. 28. 40. 631 P.2d 1014.
1020 (1981) (applying WASH. ADMIN. CODE exception for acquisition of real property). Condemna-
tion actions appear unlikely candidates for a wholesale exclusion as an activity unlikely to affect the
environment. See Jobe v. Weyerhaeuser Co.. 37 Wn. App. 718. 684 P.2d 719 (1984).
110. To mention only the prominent examples, the exemption for air pollution variances (SEPA
Rules. WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-
800)) is questionable in light of ASARCO, Inc. v. Air Quality Coalition. 92 Wn. 2d 685. 711. 601
P.2d 501, 517 (1979): as is the exemption for the acquisition of property by eminent domain, in light
of State v. Burch, 7 Wn. App. 657, 660-61, 501 P.2d 1239, 1241-42 (1972) and Public Utility Dist.
No. I of Snohomish County v. Kottsick, 86 Wn. 2d 388, 545 P.2d 1 (1976) (en bane): so, too, the
exemption for water withdrawals, SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be
codified at WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-800(4)(b)) in light of Stempel v. Department of Water
Resources, 82 Wn. 2d 109, 508 P.2d 166 (1973). The prospects of judicial approval of several of the
exemptions listed in supra note 109 would draw few wagers from those familiar with the NEPA or
SEPA case law.




dependent upon DOE making accurate calls in ruling out categories of
actions as of no environmental moment., The courts stand ready to tell
DOE who is the dog and who is the tail. The wider the gap between judi-
cial and administrative versions of SEPA compliance, the more unsettling
this intervention is likely to be.
E. Procedural Hazards
Attacks on declarations of nonsignificance as well as on the adequacy
of the statements that are prepared are vulnerable to three serious
procedural barriers. The first is standing, which has been invoked in
SEPA contexts to foreclose an attack by an economically interested prop-
erty owner against the planned expansion of a hospital, 112 a citizen chal-
lenge to an annexation making way for the construction of a log export
facility, 113 and a school policy activist's challenge to the adequacy of the
EIS attending the decision to close five elementary schools. 114 Putting to
one side the correctness of these holdings (the latter two at least are in
doubt), the important point is that SEPA, if anything, expands rather than,
contracts the roster of those in position to attack harmful environmental
actions. The legislation is designed to protect rights in a variety of re-
sources that could be called loosely a public commons. Citizen standing
to protect this common resource heritage would appear to be a necessary
corollary. 115
Somewhat more perplexing is the question of the specificity with which
SEPA objections must be advanced in order to preserve opportunities for
112. Concerned Olympia Residents For the Environment v. City of Olympia, 33 Wn. App. 677,
657 P.2d 790 (1983) (rejecting claims of "economic injury" from loss of profit from sale of property
to a competing hospital; the plaintiff owned two acres approximately due west of the hospital plan-
ning the expansion).
113. Nisqually Delta Ass'n v. City of DuPont, 95 Wn. 2d 563, 627 P.2d 956 (1981) (en banc).
114. Coughlin v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 27 Wn. App. 888, 893-94, 621 P.2d 183, 186-87
(1980) (holding also that mandamus is available to compel preparation of an EIS but not to test the,
adequacy). Contrast Byers v. Board of Clallum County Comm'rs, 84 Wn. 2d 796, 529 P.2d 823
(1974) (en banc) (recognizing standing of residents and taxpayers to challenge an interim zoning
ordinance).
115. See the comments of Justice Dore, joined by Justices Utter, Rosellini, and Williams, dis-
senting in Nisqually Delta Ass'n v. City of Du Pont, 95 Wn. 2d 563, 572, 627 P.2d 956, 961 (1981)
(en banc):
Our State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA) acts as an overlay on existing statutory
provisions, including boundary changes [citing Bellevue, supra note 48]. SEPA expresses our
state's policy that "each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environ-
ment," WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(3), and the state policies are to be administered and
interpreted "to the fullest extent possible." WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.030 (1983). This lends
further support for a liberal reading of the term "area affected" [that would allow citizens to
contest proposed boundary changes in their community].
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later attack. This is a familiar problem in environmental law. 116 Champi-
ons of procedural regularity invoke visions of the stockpiling of objec-
tions and appellate sneak attacks to sink projects years after the fact on
grounds entirely unanticipated. Disciples of forgiveness, on the other
hand, perceive the problem to be whether a struggling citizen confronting
the bureaucracy with good faith objections must be thrown out of court
for failure to pass some lawyers' literacy test. Judges are well able to
choose between these competing models. A good example is Gardner v.
Pierce Countv Board of Commissioners, 117 where the Court made clear
that objections must be advanced only with reasonable specificity, not a
chapter and verse recitation of the WAC.
By far the most severe procedural risk in SEPA cases is that review will
be foreclosed by a variety of objections (timeliness, laches, failure to ex-
haust) that the losers have bypassed opportunities to contest directly a
declaration of nonsignificance or a statement's adequacy. These "failure
to exhaust" claims become ever more common as the time lapse between
statement and action is measured in years rather than months or weeks.
Courts require a version of orderly SEPA review although with some hes-
itation. They enforce the statutory time limits for SEPA reviews' 18 while
insisting that notice be genuinely conveyed. 119 They apply exhaustion de-
fenses 120 while observing that it is unnecessary to resort to illusory
116. The Clean Air Act is perhaps the best example. See ENVIRONMENTAI, LAw. supra note 7
§ 3.2A (Supp. 1984).
117. 27 Wn. App. 241, 243-45, 617 P.2d 743. 745-46 (1980) (also rejecting defense of failure
to exhaust administrative remedies); compare Kitsap County v. Department of Natural Resources. 99
Wn. 2d 386, 391,662 P.2d 381,384 (1983) (en banc) (unanimous decision).
The SEPA guidelines were structured in such a way as to require consulted agencies to partici-
pate in the SEPA process at a time when their participation is meaningful and contributes to the
environmental assessment at the earliest possible opportunity. Where the objection to an EIS is
saved until the parties receive an unfavorable decision, the purposes of SEPA are frustrated.
118. Citizens Interested in the Transfusion of Yesteryear v. Board of Regents of the Univ of
Wash.. 86 Wn. 2d 323, 544 P.2d 740 (1976); Oden Investment Co. v. City of Seattle. 28 Wn. App
161. 622 P.2d 882 (1981): Hulo v. City of Redmond. 14 Wn. App. 568. 544 P.2d 34 (1975). Cur-
rently. SEPA reviews confront a thirty day appeal provision, WASH. REV. CODE § 43.2 1C.075(5)(a)
(1983), although this raises the bizarre possibility that the SEPA and non-SEPA portions of a lawsuit
may be filed at different times. SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be
codified at WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-680(4)(b)): see Lean. supra note 4. at 3-1, 3-51 to 3-52.
119. Seattle Shorelines Coalition v. Justen, 93 Wn. 2d 390. 609 P.2d 1371 (1980) (en banc):
Gardner v. Pierce County Bd. of Comm'rs. 27 Wn. App. 241,243-44,617 P.2d 743. 745 (1980).
120. Spokane County Fire Protection Dist. No. 9 v. Spokane County Boundary Review Bd.. 97
Wn. 2d 922, 928-29, 652 P.2d 1356, 1359-60 (1982) (en banc) (unanimous decision) (rejecting
SEPA attack on an annexation approval because the city's negative threshold determination was not
appealed to the city manager). The considerable attention paid to "scoping" or issues definition in
the Green Book. SEPA Rules. WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH.
ADMtN. CODE §§ 197-11-408. -410, -793). strongly suggests that those who decline earlier invitattons
only to jump into the fray thereafter with a new agenda will confront exhaustion barriers.
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remedies. 121 And they have run up the laches flag 22 with the warning that
it should be used sparingly to head off a genuine if disorganized public
opposition. 123
The tensions inherent in this debate over proper channels are posed
nicely by a number of Washington cases forbidding "collateral" attacks
on SEPA judgments in the course of condemnation proceedings. 124 King
County v. Burhen, 125 for example, rejected a challenge to a negative as-
sessment contesting the effects of roadbuilding on a stream by a property
owner targeted in the condemnation proceeding, to obtain an easement to
widen the road. In cases of this sort, project sponsors invoke the usual
arguments of repose and the unarguable advantage of presenting environ-
mental objections when they can be considered, corrected, and acted
upon. Losers, on the other hand, can be expected to object when they are
being marched to the firing line even though they held back when their
fate was but dimly perceived. People don't pick fights with impact state-
ments; they pick fights with projects, and especially projects that are
about to happen. It is true, moreover, that the projects described in impact
statements often resemble only remotely the project that is implemented.
Routes are changed, mitigation forgotten, new losers nominated, and old
plans shelved.
To what extent should these bypass defenses be enforced in SEPA
cases? The model of SEPA analysis is to capture the essence of the pro-
posal and its environmental effects in the EIS or in the record of the DNS
and to resolve objections then. It is necessary to pick a fight with the EIS
to record your complaints about the project. Withhold objections -to a
121. Gardner v. Pierce County Bd. of Comm'rs, 27 Wn. App. 241, 617 P.2d 743 (1980). Inter-
nal SEPA appeal procedures must meet the requirements of WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.030 (1983).
122. Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, 93 Wn. 2d 870, 875-76, 613 P.2d 1164, 1167-68
(1980) (en banc) (I 1 month delay between rezone approval authorizing construction of a shopping
center and filing of the legal action); Marino Property Co. v. Port of Seattle, 88 Wn. 2d 822, 831, 567
P.2d 1125, 1130 (1977) (en banc) ("Appellants have slept on their rights for over four years while
commercial operations at the Port were being increased."). Compare Byers v. Board of Clallam
County Comm'rs, 84 Wn. 2d 796, 798, 529 P.2d 823, 826 (1974) (en banc) (rejecting laches claim
despite a lapse of twenty months between filing of the writ of certiorari and the date of the hearing).
123. See Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, 93 Wn. 2d at 871, 613 P.2d at 1164 ("In the face of
serious defects in a rezone action, to estop a community from challenging that action solely because a
developer moved with dispatch while challengers were getting organized, raising funds, selecting an
attorney and the like, causes us some hesitation.").
124. State v. Brannan, 85 Wn. 2d 64, 530 P.2d 322 (1975) (en banc); In re Petition of Port of
Grays Harbor, 30 Wn. App. 855, 638 P.2d 633 (1982) (even while conceding inadequacies in the
declaration of nonsignificance attending the amendment of the Port's Comprehensive Scheme). Com-
pare supra note 109 (collecting case law on the exemption for condemnation actions).
125. 29 Wn. App. 497, 628 P.2d 1341 (1981); see also Save a Neighborhood Environment
(SANE) v. City of Seattle, 101 Wn. 2d 280, 676 P.2d 1006 (1984) (en banc) (applying regulation
making clear that lead agency threshold determinations shall not be repeated by other agencies for
"substantially the same proposal").
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known project and you have lost the fight. To the extent mismatches ap-
pear between the project described and that implemented, however, the
case for foreclosure disappears. A significant change may represent an
independent "major" action starting anew the process of threshold analy-
sis. 126 Violations of commitments in an earlier EIS are likely to be sub-
stantive SEPA violations with the "governmental action" for appeal pur-
poses being dated not from the time of the original EIS but from the time
of the departure from the commitments contained in that document. 127
Another possibility is the use of nuisance law where a court might be
inclined to look to commitments in an EIS or DNS for an enforceable
standard of behavior,128 even though the occasion for direct challenge to
the EIS is long since past.
1I. STATEMENT ADEQUACY OR CONTENT: WHAT IS
REQUIRED IN AN EIS?
A rule of thumb in Washington law is that a statement, any statement,
is more likely to withstand judicial review than a declaration of nonsigni-
ficance. A number of circumstances suggest that state courts may be satis-
fied with less elaborate analyses and supporting detail than one is accus-
tomed to finding in federal EIS's. A shortage of resources may justify a
scaling down of formalities. The projects proposed (often land use or sim-
ple construction endeavors) may simply lack the inherent complexities of,
say, the breeder reactor program. Also, local decisionmaking may be
served less by scorched-earth formalities and more by straight talk. Sub-
stance over form is a distinct byword of the Washington SEPA. A few
distinctive aspects of statement adequacy nonetheless deserve mention.
A. Socioeconomic Effects
The first and still the leading decision holding an EIS inadequate is
Barrie v. Kitsap County,129 which disapproved a county EIS clearing the
126. Some untimely SEPA complaints can be reviewed by calling upon the agency to prepare a
supplemental EIS, See SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-620); cf. WASH. ADrIN. CODE § 197-11-340(3) (prescribing circum-
stances for withdrawing a DNS). Any declaration of nonsignificance would be reviewable in the
ordinary course as would any supplemental EIS. For an undemanding view of the obligation to sup-
plement an EIS, see Barrie v. Kitsap County Boundary Review Bd. (Barrie III). 97 Wn. 2d 232.
235-36, 643 P.2d 433, 435-36 (1982) (en banc).
127. See WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.075 (1983).
128. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 7 § 2.10 (Supp. 1984) (discussing various sources of
standards in nuisance cases).
129. 93 Wn. 2d 843, 855-60, 613 P.2d 1148. 1155-58 (1980) (pointing out that EIS adequacy is
a question of law subject to de novo judicial review); cf. Downtown Traffic Planning Comm. v.
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way for a regional shopping center for its limited discussion of alternative
sites and of the socioeconomic impact of the project (including promi-
nently the possible deterioration and demise of Bremerton's central busi-
ness district). There are reasons to anticipate SEPA extension to consider-
ations more comfortably labelled as economic or social: urban
development projects rarely admit to a sharp bifurcation between physical
environmental effects and impacts on people; and many agencies, espe-
cially the smaller ones, can be'expected only to give one good look at a
project, lacking as they do the wherewithal to assess independently five or
six principal features of a proposal, including its economic and environ-
mental overtones.
Constituencies exist to eliminate entirely from SEPA the obligation to
consider and discuss socioeconomic effects, 130 presumably on the ground
that inquiries of this sort yield more chaff than wheat. Neither the legisla-
tion nor the WAC goes-this far although the Green Book takes the precau-
tion of banishing socioeconomic effects from the vocabulary. 131 One po-
tentially useful distinction allows the agency to include nonenvironmental
analyses in the EIS but does not oblige the project sponsor to provide
them. 132 Here is a rough line holding the sponsor responsible for produc-
ing information on its immediate project spillovers, physical and social,
but assigning to the community other types of study it wishes to conduct.
There remains a strong role for the courts in adjudging the extent to
which socioeconomic consequences must be discussed. Nuisance law
confirms repeatedly the good sense of assessing the impact of a project on
a neighborhood, including the people who live and work there, 133 and
there is every reason to believe that the SEPA is not intended to dwarf the
softer considerations of place and preference in favor of the hard data on,
say, length of the sewer line. 134 At the same time, the dominant point of
Royer, 26 Wn. App. 156, 612 P.2d 430 (1980) (a case of threshold applicability -rather than ade-
quacy).
130. SEPA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, (proposing a rule stating unequivocally that
"[alnalysis of purely socioeconomic effects of proposals or alternatives is not required in environ-
mental impact statements").
131. SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH. ADMIN.
CODE 197-11-448(2)). Subsection (3) lists examples of information, including methods of financing
and social policy analysis "that are not required to be discussed in an EIS." The Green Book also
introduces distinctions between the "natural" environment and "built" environment. See SEPA
Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-
444). For an elaboration on why the term "socioeconomic" does not appear in the legislation, see
supra note 3, at 14-15.
132. See SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-100(3)).
133. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 7 §§ 2.7, 2.8 (Supp. 1984).
134. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(b) (1983) (making clear that decisionmaking must
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SEPA is to discuss the effects of a proposal on the physical world, includ-
ing the people who live there, not on the accounting consequences of add-
ing the new coal-fired unit. Courts are perfectly able to distinguish the
socioeconomic consequences that count, such as the destruction of down-
town Bremerton, from those that do not.
B. Remote or Cumulative Effects: The Sun-Will-Shine-Tomorrow
Syndrome
The question of how much detail is enough inevitably surfaces in
SEPA litigation, and opens up another series of indeterminate choices.
The attention of the SEPA Commission,135 and the adoption of the scop-
ing procedures,1 36 confirm a desire to encourage statements that are short.
to the point, and focused in their discussion of effects and alternatives.
The 1983 Amendments make clear that the WAC rules should assure that
statements are "simple, uniform, and as short as practicable; statements
are required to analyze only reasonable alternatives and probable adverse
environmental impacts which are significant, and may analyze beneficial
impacts.'' 137
If long-winded, discursive, or speculative EIS's are a problem, it is
hardly one that has been encouraged by judges. Under one or another
version of a remoteness principle, courts have declined to require an EIS
on a public road project to discuss a contemplated condominium on pri-
vate land, 138 an EIS on an annexation proposal to discuss a shopping cen-
ter that might not be built, 139 and an EIS on a rezoning to address all kinds
of details on the roads and sewers expected to accompany the housing
development. 140 A collection of rationales justifying a truncated analysis
emerge in one case involving a proposal to develop beachfront property
as a hotel. 141 The EIS did not have to address the prospects of trespasses
insure "that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values will be given appropriate
consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations")
135. SEPA ComtwssSioN REPORT. supra note 3 at 2-3.
136. SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 197-11-408 and -793).
137. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.110(d) (1983).
138. Cheney v. City of Mountlake Terrace. 87 Wn. 2d 338. 343-44, 552 P.2d 184. 188 (1976)
(en banc) (the private development is not "part of a totally integrated plan for development with the
immediate project . . . . [Tlhere is simply no factual connection between the alleged condominium
project and construction of this urban arterial. ").
139. In re Northwest Pasco Annexation v. Franklin County Boundary Review Bd.. 100 Wn. 2d
864, 868, 676 P.2d 425, 428 (1984) (en banc) (following Cheney. 87 Wn. 2d 338, 552 P.2d 184
(1976)).
140. Cathcart-Maltby-Clearview Community Council v. Snohomish County. 96 Wn. 2d 201.
210, 634 P.2d 853, 859 (1981) (en banc).
141. Mentor v. Kitsap County, 22 Wn. App. 285. 588 P.2d 1226 (1978).
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by hotel users upon resident properties (these effects were remote and
speculative), the environmental consequences'of construction of a bulk-
head along the beachfront (a substantial development permit would be
required later), or the provisions of a comprehensive land use plan- (an
omission "unfortunate but not fatal"). 142
Informed prediction, of course, is the essence of the EIS obligation to
address "any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be imple-
mented." 143 This is true despite data shortages obscuring the details if not
the trends. One good example is the Barrie case, 144 requiring discussion
of the dimly perceived albeit very real prospect of a regional shopping
center spelling doom for a downtown business district. Another example
is the well known Polygon decision, 145 which uses a cumulative effects
analysis to condemn an unsightly condominium planned for location on
Queen Ann Hill. The obligation to discuss cumulative effects, which un-
doubtedly exists under SEPA, 146 is a good illustration of how some state-
ments are obliged to-go beyond case specifics to become predictive and
venturesome.
The 1983 Amendments insist that an EIS is required to analyze "only
those probable adverse environmental impacts which are significant."' 147
While this language disowns Herman Kahn's far-out futurism as a proper
subject of EIS analysis, it does not relieve officials from making projec-
tions within the range of plausibility. A statement of meaningful conse-
quences extended, for example, for ten to fifteen years poses precisely the
types of questions public officials ought to be asking themselves. The
result is supposed to be better decisions although any obligation to discuss
future effects may do no more than provide historians with grounds to
criticize past decisions.
The strongest indicator in Washington law of the detail that must ac-
company EIS discussion of predicted impacts is the existence of some
future forum that can address these effects and do something about them.
We will call this phenomenon the sun-will-shine-tomorrow syndrome, by
which is meant the stringency of today's EIS disclosure obligation is
correlated strongly to judicial optimism about whether the questions
raised can be answered later. The Washington Supreme Court thus has
142. 22 Wn. App. at 290, 588 P.2d at 1230.
143. WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.030(c)(5) (1983); see also id. § 43.21C.030(c)(iv).
144. Barrie v. Kitsap County, 93 Wn. 2d 843,613 P.2d 1148 (1980).,
145. Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wn. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978) (en banc).
146. SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 197-11-060(4)(c), 197-1 1-792(a)(c)(iii)).
147. WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.031 (1983).
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approved a "bare bones" EIS, 148 whose inadequacies are described vi-
vidly by Justice Utter, 149 where the nature of the project is such that later
decisionmaking sequences allow a more detailed assessment. This is true,
for example, of a rezoning to be followed by individual sector plan appli-
cations, 150 the preparation of a preliminary plat to be followed by issu-
ance of a building permit, 151 or a rezoning to be followed by considera-
tion of a substantial development permit. 152 The key seems to be whether
the decisionmaking points coming later offer credible opportunities to say
"no" and mitigate or avoid the adverse consequences.
The risk of the sun-will-shine-tomorrow strategy is a dangerous incre-
mentalism where the obligation to decide is postponed successively while
project momentum builds. There is also a prospect of an Alphonse-Gas-
ton reaction as the earlier analysis defers to that coming later and the later
analysis gives full respect to the judgments made earlier. It is one thing to
be tolerant of skimpy detail because the uncertainty will recede later on,
quite another to excuse a decisionmaker from admitting to the many un-
certainties an affirmative decision presumptively dismisses.
C. The Leaky Bucket Phenomenon
Another familiar issue of statement adequacy is whether the EIS itself
must capture the essential ingredients of the decision and thus maintain an
identity as a key decisionmaking document. There are obvious reasons of
148. Cathcart-Maltby-Clearview Community Council v. Snohomish County. 96 Wn. 2d 201.
208, 634 P.2d 853, 858 (1981) (en banc): Note, 17 GoNz. L. REV 955 (1982).
149. See 96 Wn. 2d at 208-09,634 P.2d at 858:
The EIS is a "barebones" presentation of the problem. Although it correctly identifies many
possible adverse consequences, it does not indicate their magnitude and. in several instances.
simply suggests that their impact could be later assessed when the developers seek sector ap-
provals. The EIS, as petitioners allege, is particularly devoid of any quantitative discussion as to
cumulative and secondary effects on surrounding areas. Though it mentions that there will be a
serious shortage of roads and schools, it suggests that those problems will remedy themselves as
the development occurs. As a generalization, the EIS identifies the consequences, but offers no
quantitative discussion of their possible magnitude or the costs of mitigating them.
Many EIS's fit this description, and the holding in Cathcart-Maltbv is unlikely to deter the prac-
tice.
150. 96 Wn. 2d at 210, 634 P.2d at 859 ("Piecemeal review is permissible if the first phase of
the project is independent of the second and if the consequences of the ultimate development cannot
be initially assessed."). See also Carpenter v. Island County. 89 Wn. 2d 881. 577 P.2d 575 (1978)
(en banc) (Sewer district annexation does not require an EIS but installation of facilities cannot be
undertaken without reference to environmental impact).
151. 96 Wn. 2d at 210, 634 P.2d at 859. See also ENVIRONMENTAL LAW. supra note 7 § 7.7 (on
the timing of statement preparation).
152. Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. City of Tacoma, 84 Wn. 2d 416. 424, 526 P.2d 897,
902-03 (1974) (en banc) Mentor v. Kitsap County, 22 Wn. App. 285. 588 P.2d 1226 (1976). See
also Ullock v. City of Bremerton, 17 Wn. App. 573, 578-79. 565 P.2d 1179. 1183 (1977).
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expediency and practicality to expect a drift away from EIS complete-
ness. All decisions proceed over time and.are fed constantly by new em-
pirical information, changing policy; revised plans, different people. The
EIS is not supposed to be as formally complete as, say, the record on
appeal so there are predictable tendencies among agencies to forget and
among courts to forgive failures to include in an EIS the studies, under-
standings, or other project documents well known to insiders. The Green
Book encourages this exercise in pragmatism by allowing an EIS to incor-
porate other documents by reference 53 although it holds the line with a
clear statement that an EIS should be complete in itself' 154
The difficulty with tolerating leakage of information from the EIS, for
isolated reasons that often are convincing, is that the document becomes
progressively less probative of the issues at hand. Each-time something
significant is left out, bit by incremental bit, the EIS becomes less a deci-
sion document and more a remote starting point. This incremental erosion
process is illustrated by the decision in Toandos Peninsula Association v.
Jefferson County, 155 which held that the EIS on a proposed overnight
campground development on Hood Canal was satisfactory despite fail-
ures to discuss the Shoreline Management Act, the Shoreline Master Pro-
gram, and a comprehensive plan that forbade explicitly overnight camp-
grounds in the area contended for. While, there is much in the record to
indicate a careful environmental assessment was made, 156 the EIS had
little to do with the outcome. The decision hardly encourages conscien-
tious attention to the next EIS.
Loss of probative content from impact statements takes a toll most
heavily upon outsiders who benefit from the disclosures contained in the
documents. Many insiders, no doubt, would be delighted if the opposi-
tion concentrated its fire on documents that progressively have less
weight in the actual outcome. The importance of retaining the EIS as a
153. See SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-425(6)):
Agencies shall incorporate material into an environmental impact statement by reference to
cut down on bulk, if an agency can do so without impeding agency and public review of the
action ....
154. See SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-425(1)):
Environmental impact statements shall be readable reports, which allow the reader to under--
stand the most significant and vital information concerning the proposed action, alternatives,
and impacts, without turning to other documents ....
155. 32 Wn. App. 473,483, 648 P.2d 448, 454 (1982) ("Courts will review an EIS to determine
whether the project's environmental effects are reasonably disclosed, discussed, and substanti-
ated.").
156. Id. at 479, 648 P.2d at 452. (The county commissioners' approval of the issuance of build-
ing permits was subject to a detailed site plan and 71 conditions governing construction and operation
of the campground.)
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"self-contained instrument" long has been recognized in NEPA law,' 57
and the same considerations hold true for SEPA. The tactic that will be
used most often to repair EIS's that happen to spring leaks is to demand a
supplemental statement. 15 8
D. Discussion ofAlternatives
SEPA law is firmly committed to one of the great indeterminancies of
NEPA that the obligation to discuss alternatives is bounded by considera-
tions of reasonableness.1 59 This usually means the agency should give
some hard thought to "doing nothing, doing something on a less bold
scale, and doing it in a way that minimizes adverse effects." 60 Washing-
ton law is particularly striking in its insistence that the discussion of alter-
natives address the prospects of mitigation.161 The EIS, or even the miti-
gated DNS, thus probes the prospects for friction avoidance that are
enforced in fact under the substantive requirements of the law.
The Green Book states, somewhat ambiguously, that reasonable alter-
natives "may be those over which an agency with jurisdiction has author-
ity to control impacts either directly, or indirectly through requirement of
mitigation measures." 162 This, of course, is true as far as it goes, but it is
also true that a reasonable alternative for discussion purposes is one an
agency may be utterly impotent to implement. This is bedrock NEPA
law, 163 and the reason is that the EIS's are designed to facilitate
157. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 7, at 728:
The requirement that the EIS be a self-contained instrument like a judicial opinion strengthens
its role in rationalizing agency decisions affecting the environment. [Discussing authorities].
Once the EIS becomes less than a complete environmental decision, it is in danger of becoming
just another bit of information along the way. That fate would fulfill little of NEPA's promise of
full disclosure and methodological reform.
158. SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 197-11-620). In recent years, the supplemental EIS has been a popular subject of NEPA
litigation. See D. MANDELKER, THE FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AcT (1984).
159. See, e.g.. Leschi Improvement Council v. State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wn. 2d 271.
274-75, 525 P.2d 774, 778 (1974); Toandos Peninsula Ass'n v. Jefferson County, 32 Wn. App. 473.
483-84, 648 P.2d 448,454 (1982). See also ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 7 § 7.9. at 792-98.
160. Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny. 67
GEO. L.J. 699.725-26 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
161. See, e.g., City of Richland v. Franklin County Boundary Review Bd.. 100 Wn. 2d 864.
676 P.2d 425 (1984) (en banc); Save Our Rural Environment v. Snohomish County. 99 Wn. 2d 363.
372, 662 P.2d 816, 821 (1983); Hayden v. City of Port Townsend, 93 Wn. 2d 870. 613 P.2d 1164
(1980) (en banc) (mitigated DNS case).
162. SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 197-11-440(5)(b)(iii)); see id. No. 84-05-020 (definition of "reasonable alternative").
163. The source is Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton. 458 F.2d 827. 834-35.
837 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Leventhal, J.).
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nication among agencies and break down the narrow purpose mania that
gives administrative government a bad name.
One of the more interesting variations of Washington law declares that
"[w]hen a proposal is for a private project on a specific site, the lead
agency shall be required to evaluate only the no action alternative plus
other reasonable alternatives for achieving the proposal's objective on the
same site.' ' 164 This limitation has been endorsed tentatively by the
courts1 65 but without much conviction about what is at stake. The idea
might be that site acquisition is so important to most proposals that the
alternative of doing it elsewhere is financially out of the question and
therefore unworthy of discussion. Or perhaps the notion is that developers
are entitled to a decision on a take-it or leave-it basis so that the range of
alternatives must be defined by the scope of their ambition. It is certainly
not the case that private projects never end up in the wrong place or that
developers do not consider geographically discrete locations or that pub-
lic officials always overlook questions about other sites. A failure to con-
sider offsite alternatives for private projects may yet prove unreasonable
in a given case.
While the federal government is now seething with interest over the
worst case analysis, 166 the option has received little attention in Washing-
ton law. One appeal of the approach is that it does put a ceiling (built on
guesses, to be sure) on what can go wrong and thus parrots closely an
intuitive device commonly invoked by individual and institutional deci-
sionmakers. The worst case is usually associated with analyses attending
the regulation of toxic substances or long range resource planning con-
ducted by the federal natural resources agencies. But it can prove useful
in contexts more familiarly linked to the SEPA's. A good example is
Ullock v. City of Bremerton, 167 which holds that an EIS is adequate "in a
nonproject zoning action where the environmental consequences are dis-
cussed in terms of the maximum potential development of the property
under the various zoning classifications allowed." 168 Here is the use of
the worst case to suggest that the outcome is within the range of the ac-
ceptable.
164. SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 197-11-440(5)(d)). The Red Book version confined consideration of alternatives to "the
same site or other sites owned or controlled by the same proponent." Former WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 197-11-440(12)(e) (1983).
165. See Barrie v. Kitsap County, 93 Wn. 2d 843, 853-57, 613 P.2d 1148, 1155-57 (1980) (en
banc) (emphasizing that limitation does not apply to rezoning decisions); Toandos Peninsula Ass'n v.
Jefferson County, 32 Wn. App. 473,483-84, 648 P.2d 448,454 (1982).
166. See J.E. BONINE & T.O. McGARrrY, CASES ON THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
161-73 (1984) (discussing Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983)).
167. 17 Wn. App. 573,565 P.2d 1179(1977).
168. Id.at581,565P.2dat 1184.
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1II. SEPA AS SUBSTANTIVE LAW: RESULTS AS WELL AS
PROCESS
The Washington Environmental Policy Act is celebrated nationally as a
rare breed of SEPA with a distinctive substantive bite. This SEPA sub-
stance has several expressions, which deserve separate consideration.
A. Charter Supplementation
The use of SEPA to import environmental considerations into other-
wise restrictive legislative charters has been endorsed consistently by the
Washington Supreme Court. Quite simply, this construction extends the
authority of government to say "no" for environmental reasons, even to
constituencies quite unaccustomed to this response. There is reason to
believe, for example, that the Department of Natural Resources' "top
dollar" interpretation of its land management responsibilities is in this
day insufficiently attentive to SEPA. 169
The pattern was set in the Supreme Court's first SEPA decision in
Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, where the court rejected the
claim that the "public welfare" charter of the state water code permitted
consideration of only water allocation and not water pollution in eval-
uating a water withdrawal proposal. 170 Stempel, which can be called
Washington's version of Calvert Cliffs, 17 1 took this tack over objections
of the state bureaucracy, including the attorney general's office, and in
the context of a well-established program with strong constituency sup-
port. Stempel is followed by Polygon Corp. i'. City of Seattle, 172 which
holds that SEPA vests in a city superintendent of buildings authority to
deny a building permit on environmental grounds. This was true even
169. This policy is oft-expressed in DNR circles. See also ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 7.
at 699-700 (on the "'supplementary" charter-expanding uses of NEPAl. An excellent example of
charter supplementation in Washington, not widely known, is the recognition that the Department of
Game must admit to its moose-hunting lottery persons who intend to preserve as well as destroy the
moose. See Letter from John Patterson. Wildlife Management. Department of Game. to Michael W.
Gendler, Esq., July 23, 1981 (copy on file at Washington Law Review).
170. 82 Wn. 2d 109, 117, 508 P.2d 166, 171 (1973). The court made it clear that the relevant
agency was therefore required "to evaluate the possible pollution reentry problems resulting from the
domestic water use in the vicinity of the lake" from which the withdrawals were to be made. 82 Wn.
2d at 119, 508 P.2d at 172. Stempel is overruled legislatively in limited particulars by WASH. REV.
CODE § 43.21C.035 (1983).
171. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm.. Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n. 449 F.2d 1109
(D.C.Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972) (AEC must consider environmental effects in
nuclear licensing decisions).
172. 90 Wn. 2d 59. 65, 578 P.2d 1309, 1313 (1978) (en banc); Leschi Improvement Council v.
Washington State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wn. 2d 271, 275-77. 525 P.2d 774. 779-80 (1974): see
Department of Natural Resources v. Thurston County. 92 Wn. 2d 656, 601 P.2d 494 (19791. cert.
denied. 449 U.S. 830 (1980).
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though the pre-SEPA authority might be characterized as ministerial, the
project was otherwise in compliance with existing zoning laws, and the
effects were largely aesthetic and those associated with normal growth
and standard construction (the thirteen story condominium would produce
view obstruction, shadow effects, increases in traffic and noise). In an-
other recent decision 73 the Supreme Court has affirmed a denial of a pre-
liminary plat proposal by the Skagit County Board of Commissioners on
grounds that both local law and SEPA authorize a consideration of future
environmental impact in making the regulatory choice. The Court ap-
proved the court of appeals' observations 174 that:
concern over noise and traffic, police and fire protection, schools, and other
problems of planned growth management are properly considered by a
board confronted with plans for a development which, in the words of an
opponent at the hearing, would turn a previously unused area into the fourth
largest town in Skagit County.
In addition to expanding the discretionary power of many agencies to
say "no" or to qualify their "yes" on environmental grounds, SEPA
policies have been invoked in "supplemental" fashion to contend for one
or another result favorable to the environment: expanded standing,175 re-
jection of repeal by implication arguments, 176 preparation of an EIS when
in doubt, 177 generous interpretation of other environmental laws. 178 The
substantive policies of SEPA, including the purposes to restore the envi-
ronment as well as maintain it179 and the "inalienable" rights provi-
sions,180 are thus commonly invoked in legal argument as a clincher, ver-
ifier, or tie-breaker.
173. Buchsieb/Danard, Inc. v. Skagit County, 99 Wn. 2d 577, 579-81, 663 P.2d 487, 488-89
(1983) (en bane) (distinguishing Norco Construction, Inc. v. King County, 97 Wn. 2d 680, 649 P.2d
103 (1982)).
174. 99 Wn. 2d at 579-80, 663 P.2d at 488 (quoting Buchsieb/Danard, Inc. v. Skagit County,
31 Wn. App. 489, 495,643 P.2d 460, 464 (1982)).
175. See Nisqually Delta Ass'n v. City of Du Pont, 95 Wn. 2d 563, 571-73, 627 P.2d 956,
960-61 (1981) (Dore, J., dissenting).
176. ASARCO, Inc. v. Air Quality Coalition, 92 Wn. 2d 685, 708, 601 P.2d 501, 516 (1979)
(following Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc., 82 Wn. 2d 475, 490, 513 P.2d
36,46 (1973)).
177. See Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wn. 2d 267,
278, 552 P.2d 674, 680 (1976).
178. State of Washington v. City of Seattle, 94 Wn. 2d 162, 168-69, 615 P.2d 461, 464-65
(1980) (en banc) (Dolliver, J., dissenting) (invoking SEPA in support of a city's police powers to
provide for the preservation of historic buildings); Hunt v. Anderson, 30 Wn. App. 437, 439, 635
P.2d 156, 158 (1981) (mobile home obstructing view on Lake Chelan must be removed under author-
ity of Shoreline Management Act) (quoting English Bay Enterprises, Ltd. v. Island County, 89 Wn.
2d 16, 20,568 P.2d 783, 786 (1977)).
179. WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.020 (1983).
180. Id. § 43.21C.020(3), see supra text accompanying note 13; Leschi Improvement Council v.
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B. Enforcing Mitigation; Project Turn-Downs
A variety of substantive policies are discoverable in SEPA, 181 above
and beyond the celebrated "fundamental and inalienable right to a health-
ful environment." 182 One of the most conspicuous of these could be
called a standard of maximum mitigation, which invokes the "all practi-
cable means" language of the statute 183 to support a stringent best efforts
obligation to avoid adverse environmental effects. There is no doubt that
there are duties to mitigate under SEPA, 184 and these duties are enforce-
able in the ordinary course as an aspect of substantive SEPA.
It is clear that approval of a project connotes a judgment that the sub-
stantive requirements of the Act are satisfied. 185 But the standard of judi-
cial review is unclear. Some cases embrace an arbitrary and capricious
test, 186 replete even with language suggestive of the hands-off approach
of federal NEPA law. 187 On the other hand, there is at least one decision
rejecting outright a bogus mitigation arrangement in the course of a hold-
ing that a rezoning clearing the way for a major regional shopping center
inadequately protected citizen substantive environmental rights. 188 The
Washington State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wn. 2d 271, 525 P.2d 774 (1974): Note. The Washington
Court Tackles Environmental Standing. 10 GONZ. L. REV. 817 (1975).
181. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020 (1983); duplicative; § 43.21C.060.
182. See supra note 180.
183. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(2) (1983). See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 7 § 7.5.
at 741-44, 747-50 (discussing comparable NEPA language and the standard of maximum mitiga-
tion); Note, The Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substantive Review Under NEPA. 88 HARV.
L. REV. 735 (1975).
184. See Save Our Rural Environment v. Snohomish County, 99 Wn. 2d 363. 372, 662 P.2d
816, 821 (1983) (citing Cathcart-Maltby-Clearview Community Council v. Snohomish County 96
Wn. 2d 201,209-11,634 P.2d 853.858-59 (1981)). WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060 (1983).
185. ASARCO, Inc. v. Air Quality Coalition, 92 Wn. 2d 685, 700, 601 P.2d 501. 512 (1979)
(citing Leschi Improvement Council v. Highway Comm'n, 84 Wn. 2d 271, 285. 525 P.2d 774. 784
(1974)).
186. See Ullock v. City of Bremerton, 17 Wn. App. 573, 584, 565 P.2d 1179. 1186 (1977)
(applying a de novo review as well as an arbitrary and capricious test, in dicta):
It seems evident that if a particular governmental action were to result in severe environmental
consequences and there were no other important beneficial consequences against which to bal-
ance them, the courts would be warranted in holding the action to be either ultra vires or arbi-
trary and capricious and violative of the substantive policies of SEPA.
187. See Save Our Rural Environment v. Snohomish County. 99 Wn. 2d 363. 371, 662 P.2d
816, 820 (1983) (en banc):
SEPA is essentially a procedural statute to ensure that environmental impacts and alternatives
are properly considered by the decision makers .... It was not designed to usurp local decision-
making or to dictate a particular substantive result.
Citations omitted.
188. See Save A Valuable Environment (SAVE) v. City of Bothell, 89 Wn. 2d 862. 871. 576
P.2d 401, 406 (1978) (en banc) (city's agreement with developer acknowledged that "effects on the
region 'should be mitigated; within reasonable limits'"; the court was unimpressed despite acknowl-
edgement of a restrictive standard of review).
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clear inference is that the question of adjudging compliance is a legal is-
sue for the courts immune from administrative opinions. Over the long
run administrative sponsorship is unlikely to win exemptions for environ-
mental damage perceived by the courts to be avoidable or otherwise unac-
ceptable. 189
Law students meeting NEPA for the first time are baffled consistently
by the revelation that this most famous of environmental laws promises
process galore without judicial weapons against destructive results. A
substantive right of mitigation or minimization of friction without more is
similarly incomplete if it settles for best efforts even in the face of an
appalling outcome. The circle is closed by recognition of a power to say
"no"-to turn down a project despite every procedural and substantive
precaution to reach accommodation with environmental needs. Some-
times a hard look and maximum mitigation are not quite enough.
This ultimate power to disapprove is clearly sanctioned by the Wash-
ington SEPA although project losers are protected by some uncertain pro-
cess rights. One provision specifies that project conditions or denials
"shall be based upon policies identified by the appropriate governmental
authority and incorporated into regulations, plans, or codes which are for-
mally designated by the agency (or appropriate legislative body, in the
case of local government) as possible bases for the exercise of authority
pursuant to this chapter."190 This is either a strict rulemaking require-
ment, in which event it will be rarely complied with, or a loose notice
provision, in which event it will be routinely complied with. The reason
that a strict rulemaking precondition would be largely fatal to substantive
SEPA is that inventing detailed before-the-fact specifications for sui gen-
eris conflict is an unproductive enterprise, especially for busy decision-
makers who are obliged to respond to problems of the moment at the
189. Cf. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 7 § 2.10 (1984 Supp.) (discussing legalized nui-
sance).
190. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060 (1983) reads in pertinent part:
Any governmental action may be conditioned or denied pursuant to this chapter: Provided that
such conditions or denials shall be based upon policies identified by the appropriate governmen-
tal authority and incorporated into regulations, plans, or codes which are formally designated by
the agency (or appropriate legislative body, in the case of local government) as possible bases
for the exercise of authority pursuant to this chapter. Such designation shall occur at the time
specified by RCW § 43.21C.120 [generally Oct. 1, 1984, one hundred and eighty days after
adoption of the Green Book rules]. Such action may be conditioned only to mitigate specific
adverse environmental impacts which are identified in the environmental documents prepared
under this chapter. These conditions shall be stated in writing by the decisionmaker. Mitigation
measures shall be reasonable and capable of being accomplished. In order to deny a proposal
under this chapter, an agency must find that: (1) the proposal would result in significant adverse
impacts identified in a final or supplemental environmental impact statement prepared under this
chapter, and (2) reasonable mitigation measures are insufficient to mitigate the identified impact.
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expense of big picture rulemaking. If a detailed rule is the sine qua non of
a project denial, it won't happen.
A more likely reading of this "identified" policies provision is that
while it anticipates some kind of rule adoption or policy statement by the
agencies, 19 1 a general incorporation of SEPA substantive law should suf-
fice to cover the cases not yet envisaged. One reason for this interpreta-
tion is that the SEPA Commission, whose report serves as an ingredient
of the legislative history of the 1983 Amendments, explicitly approves
the Polygon decision.1 92 Polygon is distinctly a common law case where
the aesthetic grounds for rejecting the project were found in SEPA inde-
pendently of the zoning laws that were satisfied. It is difficult to perceive
how a legislator voting to endorse Polygon can be understood simultane-
ously to repudiate the decision to the extent it says anything other than
that the zoning laws must be complied with.
An interesting variation is to speculate about what happens in the
eventuality, hardly improbable, that an agency or local government does
nothing whatsoever to specify a SEPA turndown policy. One possibility
is that projects can proceed but without vulnerability to substantive SEPA
conditions or denials. Another possibility is that projects cannot be ap-
proved until the agency adopts a SEPA implementing policy. It is not
difficult to imagine what outcome is more likely to inspire crash SEPA
implementation.
The other statutory preconditions of project denials or mitigation direc-
tives (such as the findings and writing requirements) 93 are best under-
stood as a variety of hard look process rights protecting potential losers
191. Reconciliation of SEPA practice with the Washington vested rights doctrine is a delicate
enterprise. Washington adheres to a strict bright-line minority rule that entitles a developer "to have a
proposal processed under regulations in effect at the time of building permit application regardless of
subsequent changes in zoning or other regulations." R.L. SETTLE. supra note I § 2.7(b). at 41. The
rationale is said to be of common law origins "designed to serve policies of administrative conveni-
ence and predictability." Id. at 43: see Comment, Washington's Zoning Vested Rights Doctrine. 57
WASH. L. REV. 139 (1981 ). The entire SEPA enterprise, based upon study over time and a search for
project-specific mitigation. is at odds with this vested rights model of static obligation. Suffice it to
say that in the SEPA context, the Washington courts may be tempted to acknowledge a constitutional
core behind the vested doctrine (that is, takings or substantive due process) and simultaneously
concede the power of local governments to impose environmental obligations conceived after some
magical filing date. Dignifying the claim may be an ironic way to dismiss its significance. But the
proposition that there is a vested right to pollute a stream would attract few subscribers. The safest
prediction would be to expect a judicial tolerance for revised EIS's and redefined policies aimed at
heading off adverse environmental impacts.
192. SEPA COMMISSION REPORT: supra note 3. at 6. See also State Department of Natural Re-
sources v. Thurston County. 92 Wn. 2d 656, 601 P.2d 494 (1979) (en banc) (county commissioners
have authority under SEPA to deny a preliminary plat on environmental grounds: a proposed housing
development was thought inadequate to protect a bald eagle nesting site despite a project approval by
the Shorelines Hearing Board). cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980).
193. Supra note 190.
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before the agencies. Any loser certainly has a right to know what impacts
he is being called to account for and the mitigation prescribed. The re-
quirement that "action may be conditioned only to mitigate specific ad-
verse environmental impacts which are identified in the environmental
documents prepared under this chapter" suggests a wry hypothetical: can
a project be turned down on the basis of a shoddy EIS? Do project spon-
sors who write many statements under loose delegation rules have yet
more incentive to pull their punches? The point of the requirement, after
all, is to make sure that mitigation is commensurate with the predictions
of adverse effects. One court has made clear that no particular quantum of
data is necessary to support a finding of adverse impact. 194 As for disin-
centives for statement preparation, a poor statement is vulnerable on
grounds of procedural inadequacy, and a statement just good enough to
clear that hurdle is good enough also to sustain mitigation or rejection
directives.
C. Complementary Legislation and Doctrines; Damages and Other
Remedies; Reallocating Risks of Project Failure
As under NEPA, 195 SEPA litigation in Washington commonly pro-
ceeds in conjunction with a variety of other laws seeking similar procedu-
ral and substantive aims. The most likely nominees are the appearance of
fairness doctrine, 196 which serves an important role in public decision-
making, the Shoreline Management Act, 197 zoning, 198 and nuisance
claims, 199 SEPA interacts with these laws in reciprocal fashion, some-
194. Cook v. Clallam County, 27 Wn. App. 410,414, 618 P.2d 1030, 1033 (1980).
195. ENVRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 7 § 7.12.
196. See, e.g., Zehring v. City of Bellevue, 99 Wn. 2d 488, 663 P.2d 823 (1983); Harris v.
Hombaker, 98 Wn. 2d 650, 658 P.2d 1219 (1983) (en banc); City of Bellevue v. King County
Boundary Review Bd., 90 Wn. 2d 856, 586 P.2d 470 (1978) (en banc); Swift v. Island County, 87
Wn. 2d 348, 552 P.2d 175 (1976) (en banc).
197. See, e.g., Kitsap County v. State of Wash. Dep't of Natural Resources, 99 Wn. 2d 386,
662 P.2d 381 (1983) (en banc); Department of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., 89 Wn. 2d 203,
571 P.2d 196 (1977) (en banc); Hayes v. Yount, 87 Wn. 2d 280, 552 P.2d 1038 (1976) (en banc);
Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 510 P.2d 1140 (1973);
Merkel v. Port of Brownsville, 8 Wn. App. 844, 509 P.2d 390 (1973). The Act is considered in depth
in R.L. SErrLE, supra note 1, ch. 4.
198. See, e.g., Olympic View-Mukilteo Action Group v. City of Mukilteo, 97 Wn. 2d 707, 649
P.2d 116 (1982) (en banc); Cathcart-Maltby-Clearview Community Council v. Snohomish County,
96 Wn. 2d 201, 634 P.2d 853 (1981) (en banc); cf. Spokane County Fire Protection Dist. No. 9 v.
Spokane County Boundary Review Bd., 97 Wn. 2d 922, 652 P.2d 1356 (1982) (en banc) (annexa-
tion); Bellevue v. King County Boundary Review Bd., 90 Wn. 2d 856, 865, 586 P.2d 470, 476-77
(1978) (en banc) (same; "requirements of SEPA 'overlay' other statutory schemes").
199. See Miotke v. City of Spokane, 101 Wn. 2d 307, 678 P.2d 803 (1984); Cheney v. City of
Mountlake Terrace, 87 Wn. 2d 338, 552 P.2d 184 (1976) (en banc); Chambers v. City of Mount
Vernon, I 1 Wn. App. 357, 522 P.2d 1184 (1974).
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times borrowing limitations from them, 20 0 sometimes adding gloss to
them, 20 1 and sometimes providing the disclosures that invite applications
of these other laws.
One interaction not yet fully explored in the case law is the use of
SEPA to define standards of proper behavior for purposes of nuisance
suits, both against the government and private implementers.2 02 The es-
sence of nuisance law is to emphasize ways to minimize the friction be-
tween competing resource users, 20 3 and SEPA obviously prescribes re-
search, study, and behavioral obligations with the same ends in mind.
EIS prescriptions can be agreeably put to use to define the reach of rea-
sonable behavior for nuisance purposes. Another predictable role of a
substantive SEPA is to fulfill the function of the public trust doctrine,
which in several states serves to protect public resource commons from
consumptive use or detrimental reallocations into private hands. 204 Wash-
ington is not known for a lively public trust doctrine although its SEPA
contains familiar public trust themes.20 5 Not surprisingly, several of the
Washington SEPA cases look very much like conflicts that would be dis-
guised as public trust disputes in other jurisdictions. 206
The City of Spokane decision declines to adopt the "novel theory" that
money damages are available under SEPA "particularly in a case where
adequate damages are available under established theories.''207 This
"novel" eventuality may yet come to pass, as the Washington Supreme
Court has long been in the forefront of innovative tort law. The discovery
200. See Norco Construction. Inc. v. King County, 97 Wn. 2d 680. 649 P.2d 103 (1982) len
banc): South Hollywood Hills Citizen Ass'n v. King County. 101 Wn. 2d 68. 677 P 2d 114 (1984)
SEPA claims, for example, are often influenced procedurally by statutes addressing the underlying
governmental action. See Akada v. Park 12-01 Corp.. 37 Wn. App. 221,678 P.2d 1314 (1984): Hulo
v. City of Redmond. 14 Wn. App. 568, 544 P.2d 34 (1975): WASH. REV. CoDot § 43 21C.075
(1983).
201. Supra notes 175-78.
202. See ENVIRONIIENTAl. LAW. supra note 7 § 2.10 (1977 & Supp. 1984).
203. Rodgers. Bringing People Back: Toward A Comprehensive Theory of Taking In Natural
Resources Law. 10 EcoLoGY L.Q. 205, 218-20 (19821.
204. For a discussion of the public trust doctrine, see EN\RONMENTAL LAW. supra note 7 § 2 16
(1977 & Supp. 1984).
205. See WAsH. REV. CODE §§ 43.21C.020(l). (2)(a). (2)(d) (Agencies must use "all practica-
ble means" to 'fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for
succeeding generations" and to -'preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our
national heritage.").
206. See. e.g.. Miotke v. City of Spokane, 101 Wn. 2d 307. 678 P.2d 803 (1984) (pollution of
the Spokane River): Department of Natural Resources v. Thurston County. 92 Wn. 2d 656. 601 P.2d
494 (1979) (housing development threatening bald eagle nesting grounds). cert. denied. 449 U.S.
802 (1980): Sisley v. San Juan County. 89 Wn. 2d 7, 569 P.2d 712 (1977) (en banc) (marina
development in pristine spot in the San Juans); Swift v. Island County. 87 Wn. 2d 348. 552 P.2d 175
(1976) (housing development impacting rare bird life and an area listed in the National Register of
Historic Sites).
207. Miotke v. City of Spokane, 101 Wn. 2d 307, 333. 678 P.2d 803 (1984).
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of private damage remedies in citizen suit provisions is not implausible in
light of the purposes of commissioning the citizen in the clean-up ef-
fort.20 8 The boldness of the legislature in embracing the "fundamental
and inalienable" rights language rejected by Congress when enacting
NEPA20 9 is compatible with the derivation of strong remedies. Parens
patriae damage remedies are routinely available to state authorities pursu-
ing the protection of natural resources assets,210 and the "fundamental
and inalienable" language can be viewed as extending to individuals that
which used to be a closely held right of the public authorities to sue for
environmental damage. For that matter, SEPA substantive rights have
presumed equitable relief for a long time and damages can be perceived
as simply a lesser included option.
A damages remedy under SEPA is by no means pre-ordained. The crit-
ical features of SEPA strive for protection and enhancement, goals realiz-
able through injunctive orders. SEPA treats environmental assets as
something unique not simple items of trade covered comfortably by ex-
changes of dollars through the liability system. The emphasis is upon
stemming the losses not calculating payoffs. A private damages remedy
for the loss of what are often very public assets also creates its own valua-
tion and allocation problems: what is the extent of the loss? Is the first
plaintiff entitled to collect all damages for an incident on a prior appropri-
ation theory? How is a SEPA damage remedy system to be reconciled
with the closely written provisions of, say, the water pollution laws?
Under SEPA it is clear that an injunction for noncompliance is the ex-
pected remedy. There is language in the cases insisting that the burden of
compliance remains strictly upon the government agencies. 2 11 In one
case, the court resisted a segmentation compliance strategy by extending
an injunction originally entered for noncompliance with SEPA until all
permits required by the Shoreline Management Act had been obtained. 212
The order, consistent with federal cases that protect the physical environ-
ment pending compliance, 213 forbade the defendant Port Authority from
cutting timber and clearing and grading the upland portions of the project.
SEPA project denials or long interruptions have prompted frustrated
developers to lash out in a variety of directions in attempts to shift the
208. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 7 § 1.13, at 84-85.
209. Id. § 7. l, at 701-02 & n.25.
210. See id. § 4.19, at 518 & n. 10 (collecting cases).
211. See, e.g., Noel v. Cole, 98 Wn. 2d 375,379,655 P.2d 245, 248 (1983) (en banc).
212. Merkel v. Port of Brownsville, 8 Wn. App. 844, 850-51,509 P.2d 390, 395 (1973) (posing
the issue as "whether the Port may take a single project and divide it into segments for purposes of
SEPA and SMA approval").
213. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 7 § 7.10, at 801-03.
Washington Law Review
losses. Unsuccessful suits have been attempted on a conspiracy theory
against the environmental group erecting the legal obstacles 214 and on a
tort claim theory against the city modifying the permit. 215 Successful suits
have been maintained on a commercial frustration theory allowing a
gravel stripminer to get out from under a lease arrangement unexpectedly
in environmental disrepute 216 and on an unjust enrichment theory against
the Department of Natural Resources for pushing along a timber removal
project that proved to be highly vulnerable to a SEPA attack. 217 The latter
decision, in particular, will invite a variety of attempts to shift economic
losses from SEPA-related project interruptions to the agency that bungled
the EIS. This version of state insurance against environmental mishaps
lacks intuitive appeal, at the very least, and one can anticipate that Noel v.
Cole-vintage compensation will be restricted to cases where the SEPA
violations are not patently obvious, where the agency applies consider-
able coercive pressure to the project sponsor to go ahead, and where there
is no evidence that the developer aids, abets. and encourages the SEPA
shortcuts.
IV. RESPONSIBILITY FOR WRITING THE STATEMENT
The SEPA requirement that the EIS be prepared by the "responsible
official," 218 like the identical NEPA requirement. 219 has given rise to two
types of issues. The first is a delegation question of the extent to which
responsibility for statement preparation can be placed in the hands of the
private sponsors of the project. Delegation of various EIS-preparation du-
ties is widespread in Washington, and often is mandated by the imple-
menting rules of the different agencies. 220 The principal reasons for this
widespread delegation are both pragmatic (who knows most about the
proposal?) and financial (who should pay for the statement?), although
there seems to be an unspoken rule that the one who pays should bear the
principal honor of preparation.
214. Lange v. The Nature Conservancy. Inc., 24 Wn. App. 416. 601 P.2d 963 (1979). cert.
denied. 449 U.S. 831 (1980).
215. Dunstan v. City of Seattle. 24 Wn. App. 265. 600 P.2d 674 (1979) (tort suit liled two years
after issuance of a modified building permit containing SEPA-inspired restrictions: suit barred bN the
SEPA statute of limitations for review of governmental actions).
216. Weyerhaeuser Real Estate Co. v. Stoneway Concrete. Inc.. 96 Wn. 2d 558, 637 P.2d 647
(1981) (en banc).
217. Noel v. Cole, 98 Wn. 2d 375381-83,655 P.2d 245. (1983).
218. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c) (1983).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1982): ENVIRONMENTAt. LAW. supra note 7 § 7.8.
220. See, e.g.. SEPA Rules. WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 94-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-960) (the environmental checklist. which serves as the principal rax%
material for all threshold determinations, is to be prepared by the applicant).
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It goes without saying that the EIS process anticipates an independent
agency judgment and not the parroting of partisan opinion. In Washing-
ton, an explicit procedure exists requiring the designation of the responsi-
ble official. 221 With this person known, one would expect litigation to
focus upon the extent to which this official can attest to the independency
of judgments reflected in the DNS or EIS. The likely attitude of the courts
is suggested by the decision in Brown v. City of Tacoma,222 rejecting a
delegation argument with these observations:
The extensive review and consideration given the [applicant's] checklist
and the modifications ordered and studies conducted belie Brown's conten-
tions that the Department relied upon the allegedly biased and erroneous
checklist and "rubber stamped" its approval of the project on that basis. 223
The second major question attending statement preparation requires
identification of the "lead agency" for purposes of carrying out the envi-
ronmental analyses. This nomination process obviously involves sensi-
tive issues of agency status and turf protection, as attested to by the exten-
sive WAC rules developed on the subject. 224 The regulations attempt to
bring some order to potentially chaotic contests over the allocation of
SEPA responsibilities by identifying the lead agencies for certain types of
proposals225 and by giving the Department of Ecology authority to re-
solve lead agency disputes. 226 In litigation, an Alphonse-Gaston response
is clearly detectable as agencies charged with shirking their SEPA respon-
sibilities defend on the ground that they do not have lead agency responsi-
bilities. 227 This is an unfortunate situation, and it bears out predictions
that heavy reliance upon lead agency nominations may sacrifice compli-
221. SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 197-11-910); see D.E.B.T., Ltd. v. Board of Clallam County Comm'rs, 24 Wn. App. 136,
600 P.2d 628 (1979) (Board of Clallam County Commissioners is the "responsible official" and is
not bound by the contrary conclusions of the Clallam County Planning Commission).
222. 30 Wn. App. 762, 637 P.2d 1005 (1981).
223. Id. at 765, 637 P.2d at 1007.
224. SEPA Rules, WASH. ADMIN. REG. No. 84-05-020 (1984) (to be codified at WASH. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 197-11-922 to -948).
225. Id. §§ 197-11-926to-938.
226. Id. § 197-11-946.
227. Harris v. Hombaker, 98 Wn. 2d 650, 658 P.2d 1219 (1983) (en banc) (Department of
Transportation, not the Franklin County Board, was the lead agency for purposes of deciding where
to locate a highway interchange); see also Save a Neighborhood Environment (SANE) v. City of
Seattle, 101 Wn. 2d 200, 676 P.2d 1006 (1984) (en banc) (lead agency threshold determinations
binding on other agencies for "substantially the same proposal"); City of Bellevue v. King County
Boundary Review Bd., 90 Wn. 2d 856, 865-67, 586 P.2d 470, 476-77 (1978) (en banc); Spokane
County Fire Protection Dist. No. 8 v. Spokane County Boundary Review Bd., 27 Wn. App. 491, 618
P.2d 1326 (1980) (annexation clearing the way for a major subdivision was assessed by the plan
commission and not the review board approving the annexation).
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ance at the altar of efficiency and avoidance of duplication. 228 The ulti-
mate remedy available to the courts is to insist that "the responsible offi-
cial" for EIS purposes resides within agency A even though the
Department of Ecology has declared that agency B is the lead agency. An
agency that gladly opts out or one that is reluctantly squeezed out of its
environmental review responsibilities may be pulled back in by this kind
of interpretation.
V. CONCLUSION
Washington's SEPA offers confirmation of legal theories suggesting
that identical statutes evolve in somewhat different directions in varying
cultural and political contexts. While its common ancestry with NEPA
remains unmistakable, the Washington SEPA has taken on plumage that
sets it apart. The Washington approach is short on process, long on sub-
stance. It is inattentive to high standards of articulation in the statements,
receptive to avoid-the-paperwork and exhaust-proper-channels argu-
ments. At the same time, it focuses upon results and is unwilling to accept
procedural generosity as a fair tradeoff for a polluted stream. Slick state-
ments are no substitutes for clean water. Washington will be best known
as the state whose SEPA elevates substance over form.
228. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 7 § 7.8, at 783-85. The opinion in Sisley v. San Juan
County, 89 Wn. 2d 78, 85-88, 569 P.2d 712, 716-18 (1977) (en banc), is especially attentive to the
obligation of agencies to decide for themselves rather than parrot other opinions.
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